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CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND
JOHN BINGHAM’S THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
Rebecca E. Zietlow*
In the Twentieth Century, Congress’ power to enact civil rights
legislation, and make it privately enforceable against states and private
parties, became widely recognized as one of the most important
functions of the federal government. Yet in recent years, the Supreme
Court has greatly restricted this function with its rulings restricting
Congress’ commerce power1 and its power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Cases such as United States v. Morrison,3 Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett4 and Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents5 have left Congress in a vacuum, without any clear source of
power to enact civil rights legislation that is enforceable against the
*Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Richard Aynes, Michael
Curtis, Paul Finkelman, James Fox, Joseph Slater and Bryan Wildenthal for their comments on this
project. Thanks to Dean Aynes and the University of Akron School of Law for organizing this
excellent symposium, and to all of the participants in the symposium for informing me and inspiring
me. Finally, thanks to the University of Toledo College of Law for providing me with a summer
research grant so that I could work on this project.
1. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil rights
provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990).
2. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress
lacks the power to abrogate state’s immunity to suit for violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down the civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks the
power to abrogate state’s immunity to suit for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as applied to states and establishing a “congruence” and “proportionality” test to
measure the validity of Section 5 legislation).
3. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (deciding Civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act
was beyond both Congress’ commerce and Section 5 enforcement powers).
4. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act that
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity was beyond Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power).
5. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity was beyond Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power).
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states or private parties. These rulings have many scholars wondering
where Congress can turn when it wants to enact civil rights legislation in
the future.6 Largely overlooked in this discussion is a possible solution
to the problem. This solution is another clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—the Citizenship Clause—and the rights of federal
citizenship,7 which its Framers intended to be a broad font of federal
rights that would be enforceable by Congress.
John Bingham, the chief author of Section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment, had a broad vision of national citizenship and the rights
that adhered thereto. This essay argues that the Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment reflects his view and provides a source of
congressional power to define and protect civil rights against
infringement by states and private parties. Congressional debates about
one of the most contentious issues leading up to the Civil War, the status
of fugitive slaves and the rights (if any) of free people of color, reflect
fundamental disagreements between Northern and Southern members of
Congress over the existence and meaning of the federal rights of
citizenship. After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Reconstruction era, civil rights statutes reflect the fact that the Thirtyninth Congress adopted an expansive vision of the rights of federal
citizens and that Congress embraced its role as protector of those rights.
Unfortunately, after Reconstruction, Congress’ expansive vision of
the rights of federal citizenship faded. In the civil rights era of the
1960s, Congress relied on other sources of power such as the Commerce
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In upholding the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Court relied solely on Congress’ commerce power,
tying its legislation to economic theory rather than principles of equality

6. See, e.g., James G. Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002)
(arguing that as a result of Morrison, enacting human rights protections may now fall outside the
scope of congressional power altogether); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
Law: Federal Anti-Discrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 502
(2000) (“[T]he decisive question raised by Morrison’s appeal to federalism is whether the nation
has retreated from the view that a central mission of the federal government is to protect individuals
against discrimination by public and private actors.” ).
7. But see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected
Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2000); William J. Rich,
Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 153 (2002) (advocating congressional enforcement of the privileges or immunities of
citizenship); James W. Fox, Re-readings and Mis-readings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities and Section 5 Enforcement Powers, 91 K.Y.L.J. 67 (2002) (discussing congressional
enforcement of the privileges or immunities of citizenship).
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and human rights.8 In retrospect, Congress’ choice to rely on the
commerce power was arguably unfortunate because it raised the specter
of unlimited federal police power without any significant limiting
principles.9 The breadth of the Court’s Commerce Clause rulings has
come back to haunt Congress now, with the Court placing new limits on
the commerce power in Lopez and Morrison primarily because it saw
that power as overly threatening to state sovereignty.10 At the same
time, in Kimel and Garrett the Court limited Congress’ power to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause because the Court felt that its judicial power
was threatened by congressional interpretation of that Clause.11 Finally,
this essay will explain why the Citizenship Clause and the rights of
federal citizenship may enable Congress to get around the roadblocks to
civil rights legislation erected by the Court in Morrison, Kimel and
Garrett.
I. BINGHAM’S VISION OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP
John Bingham envisioned federal citizenship as a guarantee that
certain fundamental rights of citizens should be uniform throughout the
United States, and that states should be unable to deprive federal citizens
of those rights. Bingham also had a broad vision of the substantive
rights encompassed in the concept of federal citizenship. Well before
the Reconstruction era, Bingham stated that the rights of citizenship
included:
[T]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue
and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of
their toil . . . the charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic
ideals which it embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in
respect of those rights of person which God gives and no man or state
may rightfully take away.12

The Fourteenth Amendment reflects Bingham’s expansive view of
federal citizenship rights and gives Congress the power to protect these
rights. However, prior to the Civil War, this view was quite
8. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Pope, supra note 6. But see Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619 (2001) (critiquing the false dichotomy
between women’s rights and economic rights).
9. Pope, supra note 6. But see Resnik, supra note 8 (noting the link between economic
empowerment and women’s empowerment).
10. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
11. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 457.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
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controversial and gave rise to heated congressional debates over the
relationship of citizenship between the state and federal governments.
Although there was widespread agreement about what it meant to be a
“citizen,” the disagreement centered around the question of who could
become a citizen13 and the role, if any, that the federal government
played in defining and protecting citizenship rights.
Prior to the Civil War, Bingham’s vision of the rights of federal
citizenship was a minority view. Congressional debates during the
antebellum era reveal that the meaning of citizenship rights was
extremely controversial, repeatedly sparking disputes between northern
and southern representatives. These disputes centered on the status of
free blacks and the question of whether or not Blacks could become
citizens. Bingham and other antislavery constitutionalists believed that
the federal Constitution authorized northern states to bestow citizenship
upon free blacks, and provided for those rights to be protected by the
federal government.14 On the other hand, other members of Congress,
primarily from slaveholding states, adamantly believed that only states
could bestow citizenship rights, and that the federal government played
absolutely no role in this arena. Lurking behind these debates was the
problem of fugitive slaves. While representatives from slaveholding
states were happy to use federal power to force northern states to return
fugitive slaves, they resisted any interpretation of federal power that
might allow northern states to free fugitive slaves and immunize them
from southern laws.15
A. Pre-Civil War Congressional Debates Over the Meaning of
Citizenship
Prior to the Civil War, Congress did not play any role in the
definition and enforcement of individual rights. In Barron v. City of
Baltimore,16 the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights did not limit
state governments. This ruling recognized a sphere of autonomy for the
states in the area of individual rights.17 Equally important was that the
13. Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
681, 691 (1997).
14. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L. J. 57, 71 (1993).
15. See Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN
UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125 (Kermit L.
Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds. 1989).
16. 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied only to the
federal government).
17. During Reconstruction, some members of Congress, including John Bingham, did not
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Constitution did not expressly give Congress the power to legislate in
the area of individual rights. The Bill of Rights does not include any
congressional enforcement provisions.18 With the possible exception of
the 1789 Judiciary Act,19 the only major piece of federal legislation
affecting individual rights enacted by Congress during this era was the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.20 The Fugitive Slave Act prohibited nonslave states from freeing slaves and required them to return fugitive
slaves to their owners in slave states.21 The Court upheld congressional
power to enact the Fugitive Slave Act in the case of Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,22 notwithstanding the fact that the Fugitive Slave Clause
has no enforcement provision, in part because the Court saw the Clause
as protecting the fundamental right to own slaves.23
Thus, prior to the Civil War, congressional authority in this area
was not exercised to champion civil rights. Instead, Congress used its
power to prohibit free states from conveying minimal human rights to
the enslaved people that lived within Congress’ jurisdiction.24 A review
believe that Barron was good law, and argued that the Bill of Rights did apply to the states. See
Aynes, supra note 14, at 69; MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1986) (Republicans rejected Barron v. Baltimore during
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 145-62 (1998) (discussing the “Barron contrarians”).
18. This was a major concern of John Bingham who supported the Fourteenth Amendment in
large part because it would empower Congress to enact legislation protecting the rights of federal
citizens. See infra, notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
19. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal courts and bestowed
diversity jurisdiction upon them, creating a federal forum for the vindication of rights. See ROGERS
M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (arguing
that the diversity jurisdiction in Article III reflected a view of the federal government as the
protector of some citizenship-based rights).
20. 1 Stat. 305 (1793).
21. This statute was based on Congress’ power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause U.S.
CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3.
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842). Prigg was one of the Court’s broadest readings ever of
congressional power, owing to the fact that the Fugitive Slave Clause lacked a congressional
enforcement mechanism. See Akhil R. Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 69 (1999). Congress later enacted an even
more broadly sweeping Fugitive Slave Act in 1950, which the Court upheld in Ablemon v. Booth, 21
How. 526. Congress relied on Prigg when it enacted the later, broader, law. Amar, supra at 70.
23. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 569. See Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24
RUTGERS L. J. 605, 608 (1993).
24. Although some members of Congress considered freed slaves to be citizens, see infra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court found that they were not United States
citizens, and that indeed no people of African descent could be United States citizens, in the
infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to overturn the Court’s ruling in Scott. See infra,
notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Ironically, in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Court
identified a fundamental right of slaveholders to recover their fugitive slaves as one of the sources
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of congressional debates during that time reveals two conflicting visions.
On one hand, some members of Congress believed that citizenship rights
were determined by states, without any national character.
Paradoxically, those same members of Congress supported federal
power in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which enlisted federal
magistrates to aid states in denying rights of citizenship to free blacks as
well as slaves.
On the other hand, some members of Congress believed that the
rights of citizenship had a national character, guaranteed by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.
They understood that Clause, which provides that “The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
Several States,” to prohibit states from taking away from people the
rights of citizenship that had been bestowed upon them by other states.
These members of Congress were influenced by opponents of slavery
such as Joel Tiffany, an abolitionist lawyer from Ohio. In his influential
1849 book, called Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery,25
Tiffany argued that “the object of the national government was to protect
the natural and inalienable rights of each citizen.”26 Moreover, in his
influential treatise, Kent’s Commentaries, Chancellor Kent defined free
blacks born in the United States as citizens.27 Many Republicans in the
39th Congress expressed views similar to those expressed by Tifanny
and Kent when they debated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights legislation.28 But even at the time that those books were
published, well before the Civil War, some members of Congress agreed
with them. In their view, the fact that a person was a citizen of one state
meant that his basic rights could not be taken away from him by another
state.
1. Mr. Hoar’s Journey
The role of federal citizenship and the rights that inhered therein,
were central to congressional debates over the so-called “Negro
of congressional power to enact legislation assisting them to do so. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 581-83.
25. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
(1849). See CURTIS, supra note 18.
26. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 43 (citing TIFFANY, supra note 25, at 55).
27. 2 CHANCELLOR KENT, KENT’S COMMENTARIES, (1840). John Bingham quoted
Chancellor Kent in support of this proposition in the debates over the admission of Oregon. See
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 892 (1859). See also TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO
LAW 131 (Da Capo Press 1972) (2d ed. 1844) (indicating that “all” people born in the United States
since the Declaration of Independence were citizens).
28. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 42.
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Seamen’s Acts,” laws which southern port states enacted in the late
1840s to authorize the arrest of free blacks that entered their states. In
1849, Representatives Charles Hudson and George Ashmun, whigs from
Massachusetts, decried two such laws, enacted by the states of South
Carolina and Louisiana.29 The laws were enacted in response to the
arrest of Denmark Vesey in Charleston, a free black man from the North
who allegedly came to Charleston in order to foment a rebellion.30
Hudson and Ashmun were particularly concerned about those laws
because their state, Massachusetts, had a large shipping industry that
employed many sailors.31 They argued that the South Carolina law
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV because it
authorized the imprisonment of free citizens from their state.32
“In the state of Massachusetts the black man was as much a citizen
as a white man,” said Hudson, complaining that if one of those citizens
of color were to go to South Carolina, “his person, and perhaps his life,
may be in danger” solely because of the color of his skin.33 Similarly,
Ashmun explained that his problem with the South Carolina law was
that it was enforced against “our citizens.”34 Thus, even as they
recognized that the rights of the freed citizens of color adhered to state,
not federal, citizenship, they articulated a national view of citizenship
that would protect the rights of state citizens, once those rights were
bestowed upon them, against interference by other states. They believed
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV required comity
between the states, comity that included respecting the rights that each
state bestowed on its own citizens.
Representative Hudson believed that the South Carolina law
violated the U.S. Constitution. He wanted the Supreme Court to decide
whether it was constitutional or not, but South Carolina had resisted
federal review.35 Hudson accused South Carolina of avoiding Supreme
Court review through the doctrine of interposition, a belief that states
could decide for themselves whether or not a law was constitutional.36
29. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849).
30. See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849) (statement of Representative Robert
Rhett of South Carolina).
31. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator Davis of
Massachusetts).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.”) See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d
Sess. 418-19 (1849).
33. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849).
34. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849).
35. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849).
36. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. (1849). In the case of Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F.
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This concern was shared by a number of members of Congress, who
supported federal intervention in this area. Some articulated their
concern by telling the story of Samuel Hoar, a minister from
Massachusetts who traveled to South Carolina for the purpose of
challenging the constitutionality of the South Carolina law.37 Rather
than arrest Mr. Hoar and his companions, which could have set up the
possibility of a legal challenge, South Carolina officials ordered Mr.
Hoar to leave town.38
Members of Congress who advocated a broad view of federal
citizenship rights often mentioned the story of Mr. Hoar to illustrate their
concerns about southern laws that they believed violated the
constitutional principles of citizenship.39 Mr. Hoar’s journey serves as a
powerful metaphor for what northern advocates of national citizenship
rights did not like about the treatment of their citizens by southern
states—that northern citizens could have their most basic human rights
taken away from them by southern states solely due to the color of their
skin.40 They also resented the disrespect for the northern states’
conveyance of citizenship rights that this practice reflected.41
In response to the citizenship based advocacy of their northern
colleagues, southern members of Congress argued that the Constitution
did not protect people of color from other states because those people
were not, and could not be, citizens of the United States. For example,
Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina stated that “colored
persons . . . are a species of persons having such rights only as may be
conferred upon them by state jurisdiction; they have no federal
eligibility, or federal recognition, as citizens of the United States.”42
Cas. 493 (1823), Justice Johnson, riding circuit, declared the South Carolina Act unconstitutional.
However, South Carolina defied that decision and continued to enforce the law. See Finkelman,
supra note 16.
37. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator John Davis of
Massachusetts).
38. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator Henry Clay of
Kentucky).
39. See, e.g., CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (Trumbull); CONG. GLOBE, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess. App. 123 (1850) (Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1654 (1850)
(Winthrop); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849) (Ashmun); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong.,
2d Sess. 418 (1849) (Hudson).
40. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1654 (1850) (statement of Senator Robert
Winthrop of Massachusetts).
41. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 45–46. The main difference between radical abolitionists and
most Republicans was that the radicals thought that slaves were citizens. Id. During the civil war,
more and more Republicans started believing that slaves were citizens and the line between the two
all but disappeared. Id.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 288 (1850).
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Butler explained that his understanding was that a state can give a
colored person a “status” of being free. However, that “status” would
not govern in other states and instead would depend on the local law of
the state. “Their condition must be assimilated under the law that
operates on them.”43
That the southern view of citizenship dominated in Congress prior
to the Civil War was evident from the fact that shortly after Hudson’s
and Ashmun’s dissertation on the rights of citizenship, Congress refuted
them by enacting the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The 1850 Act
responded to reluctant northern officials who often refused to enforce the
federal law and to some state legislatures that enacted state laws
prohibiting the implementation of the 1793 Act.44 The 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act provided for the appointment of a federal commissioner in
every county of the nation to enforce it, and authorized federal marshals
and, federal troops if necessary, to aid in the capture of fugitive slaves.
“The law created exclusive federal power to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Clause and placed the prestige of the national government behind the
rendition of fugitive slaves.”45
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 not only deprived the northern
states of the power to shelter fugitive slaves, but, in a blow to the
sovereignty of the northern states, also superceded reluctant northern
officials and enlisted federal “help” to ensure that the task would be
carried out. As a result of this federal law, northern free people of color
were in danger not only when they traveled to southern states, but also in
the north, because the weak evidentiary standards of the Federal Act
placed them in danger of being kidnapped in the northern state in which
they lived.46 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 dramatically illustrates the
fact that the proponents of strong rights of citizenship were a distinct
minority in Congress prior to the Civil War.
2. The Oregon Debates
Like the majority of those in Congress at the time, the Supreme
Court adopted the southern view of the Privilege and Immunities Clause
of Article IV. In Dred Scott v. Sanford,47 the Court held that the clause
did not require a slave state to recognize the laws of a non-slave state
43. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 288 (1850).
44. See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 664.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 623. Such a scenario happened leading up to the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania. 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 613.
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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which purportedly had freed Mr. Scott from slavery. Significantly, the
Court articulated a broad view of the rights that federal citizens enjoy.48
However, the Court excluded all African Americans from enjoying those
rights, ruling that no person of color could be a citizen of the United
States.49 In his majority opinion, Justice Taney differentiated between
state and United States citizenship, and held that being a citizen of one
state does not entitle one to the rights and privileges of another state.50
The Dred Scott ruling deprived northern states of the power to bestow
meaningful citizenship rights on freed blacks because those rights would
only extend as far as that state’s borders. Notwithstanding the Dred
Scott ruling, the broad vision of federal citizenship rights expressed by
Hudson and Ashmun survived and flourished among other members of
Congress in the years approaching the Civil War. During this period,
Bingham was a strong proponent of an expansive approach to the rights
of federal citizenship.
In 1858, members of Congress debated whether or not to admit the
territory of Oregon into the Union as a state. At issue was a provision of
the Oregon State Constitution that would have allowed Oregon to
exclude free people of color, and prohibit them from owning property,
entering into contracts, and filing suit in Oregon state court.51 Some
members of Congress opposed Oregon’s admission because they
believed that the provision of the Oregon Constitution violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.52 Central to this debate
was a dispute over the meaning of citizenship and the extent to which
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV limited the power of
some states to take away rights of citizens of other states. This debate,
which occurred shortly before the Civil War, foreshadowed the
congressional debate over the rights of citizenship during
Reconstruction.
John Bingham was chief among advocates of national citizenship
48. Id. at 417 (describing the rights of citizenship as “the right to enter every other State
whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport . . . the full liberty of
speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”).
49. Id. at 404. Indeed, Justice Taney listed the rights of citizenship to illustrate his point that
Blacks could not possibly be entitled to so many rights, and thus could not be citizens. Id. at 41617. See James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Party and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421,
484 (1999).
50. Scott, 60 U.S. at 405.
51. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858) (Bingham). Some other northern states
already admitted into the Union, including Illinois and Missouri, also had constitutional provisions
prohibiting the entry of free blacks into the state. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988).
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 1.
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rights. In 1858, he explained, “[i]t has always been understood that the
citizens of each state of the Union are ipso facto citizens of the United
States.”53 Like those before him, Bingham believed that the fact that one
state had recognized a person as its citizen triggered the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, preventing any other state from taking
away the rights of citizenship, conveyed to him by his home state.54 Of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he opined, “this guaranty of the
Constitution of the United States is senseless and a mockery, if it does
not limit state sovereignty and restrain each and every State from closing
its territory and courts of justice against citizens of the United States.”55
This reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause directly conflicted
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading of the Clause in Dred Scott.56
However, like a number of other Republicans at the time, Bingham
simply disregarded the Dred Scott ruling as being incorrect.57
Along the same line, Senator William Fessenden, a Republican
from Maine, explained that his state had free colored citizens and that he
could not agree to admit Oregon as a state because Oregon would not
allow citizens of his own state to visit.58 Fessenden said:
By the laws of Maine, and under the constitution of the state of Maine,
free Negroes are citizens . . . just as much citizens of the state of Maine
as white men. . . . I cannot vote for the admission of any State with a
constitution which prohibits any portion of my fellow citizens of my
own state from the enjoyment of the privileges which other citizens of

53. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858). Similarly, Representative Fessenden of
Maine expressly disavowed the validity of the Dred Scott decision, stating that he did not believe
that Dred Scott accurately stated the law. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858).
54. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1858).
55. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1858).
56. Scott, 60 U.S. at 405.
57. For example, criticizing the Dred Scott decision in a speech before Congress in April,
1860, Bingham defiantly exclaimed:
With Jefferson, I deny that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter on all questions of
political power, and assert that the final arbiter on all such questions is the people . . .
While I could condemn armed resistance to any decision of the Supreme Court . . I
would claim for myself, in common with my fellow-citizens, the right to question their
propriety, to denounce their injustice, and to insist that whatever is wrong therein shall
be corrected.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong, 1st Sess. 1839 (1860). See also CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess.
402 (1858) (Fessenden) (stating that he did not believe that the Dred Scott opinion “accurately
stated the law.”).
58. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858). Representative Clark Cochrane of New
York also argued that the exclusion provision of the Oregon Constitution violated the privileges and
immunities clause. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1964 (1858).
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the state have.59

To Bingham, national citizenship meant more than simply the right
to enter the borders of other states. The concept of national citizenship
was a central component of Bingham’s ideology.60 Bingham believed
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected the
rights of national, rather that state, citizenship. In a speech during the
debate over the admission of Oregon, Bingham explained that the
Privileges and Immunities of Article IV belonged to citizens “in” the
several states, not “of” the several states.61 This interpretation of Article
IV “implies the existence of substantive national rights which states may
not deny.”62
Bingham and others were especially concerned about Oregon’s
provision that would have denied people of color access to state courts.
Bingham explained that he could not consent to “mutilate and
destroy . . . the Constitution of my country” by supporting a bill which
allows a state to deny “the right to a fair trial in the courts of justice.”63
Echoing Bingham’s concerns, Senator Henry Wilson, Republican of
Massachusetts,64 protested that the prohibition on access to the courts
would have prevented a free citizen of color from Massachusetts from
filing suit if he was injured in Oregon.65 Others agreed that the bar on
access to the courts violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.66
Of course, Bingham’s view of the rights of citizenship did not go
unopposed. Some opponents simply cited Dred Scott to refute his
59. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1964 (1858).
60. See Aynes, supra note 14, at 69. According to Dean Aynes, the other components of
Bingham’s ideology included the belief that the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens protected by
Article IV included all of the rights in the Bill of Rights, that the Bill of Rights were enforceable
against the states even prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that Congress
lacked the power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship because Article IV lacked
a congressional enforcement provision. Id.
61. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859); see also Aynes, supra note 14, at 69.
62. Aynes, supra note 14, at 70.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
64. Wilson, Henry, 1812-1875, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). Wilson served as a
senator from January 31, 1855 to March 3, 1873, when he resigned to become Vice President under
President Ulysses S. Grant. Id.
65. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1966-67 (1858).
66. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 974-75 (1859) (Representative Dawes
arguing that the provision preventing people of color from entering contracts, owning property and
suing in courts violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 980 (1859) (Representative Clark Cochrane arguing the same). See also CONG. GLOBE, 35th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1966-67 (1858) (Senator Wilson), CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 974-75
(1859) (Representative Dawes).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/5

12

Zietlow: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights
NEWZEITLOW.DOC

2003]

7/28/03 11:50 AM

CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS

729

points.67 Others pontificated that states had the power to exclude
whomever they chose, and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did
not prevent them from doing so.68 For example, Representative Linus
Comins, a Republican from Massachusetts, while stating his “regret”
about the exclusion provision, argued that the exclusion provision was
not a reason to prohibit Oregon from becoming a state because it was
consistent with the west’s treatment of free blacks.69 Along the same
vein, Senator Steven Douglas, a Democrat from Illinois who later ran
against Abraham Lincoln in the presidential campaign of 1860, pointed
out that Illinois had a similar provision excluding free people of color,
and argued that Illinois, like Oregon, had a sovereign right to do so.70
“Whether she does so or not is a question for herself, and not for any
other state to interfere with.”71 Democrats continued to articulate a
cramped reading of the rights of citizenship in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause during the debate over the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.72
Bingham’s and Fessenden’s views are significant because of the
role that those men played in drafting the Reconstruction Amendments.
Both were members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in the
39th Congress and Bingham was the principle draftsman of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, by 1866 most
Republicans shared Bingham’s and Fessenden’s view that free blacks
were citizens73 and “believed in a body of national rights that states were
required to respect.”74 These views on national citizenship and the rights
that adhere thereto were reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights legislation that Congress enacted during Reconstruction.

67. See, CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858) (Representative Clark, of Missouri,
relying on Dred Scott as authority for his position that blacks are not, and cannot be citizens of the
United States).
68. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965 (1858) (Senators Trumbull and Douglas);
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 974 (1858) (Representative Comins).
69. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. at 974 (1859).
70. Other northern states also excluded free Blacks, including Ohio.
71. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965 (1858).
72. CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1122-23, 1156 (1866) (Rogers). They argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV merely protected citizens of each state while
temporarily visiting any other state. See CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1269 (1866) (Kerr).
See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 81. (“Republican speakers supported the bill on grounds of a
paramount national citizenship and a national body of fundamental privileges and immunities; the
Democratic doctrine was more in keeping with accepted Supreme Court doctrine.”).
73. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 46.
74. Id. at 48.
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B. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The themes of the congressional debate over the meaning of
citizenship in some way played themselves out during the Civil War.
Central to that War was the question of “whether a citizen owed his
primary allegiance to the national or state government.”75 When the
Confederate states seceded from the Union, they asserted their sovereign
right to treat people as they chose, regardless of any protections in the
United States Constitution that might otherwise have existed, in the most
dramatic fashion possible. The conflict between state autonomy and
federal power was resolved in favor of federal power to bestow national
citizenship rights when the Union won the War.76 Following the War,
Bingham’s vision of national citizenship and the rights that adhered
thereto became an animating force behind the Reconstruction
Amendments and the Civil Rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era.77
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State
wherein they reside.”78 Its companion, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, provides further that “No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”79 The Framers intended the Citizenship Clause to clarify the
fundamental relationship between the state and federal governments at
the end of the Civil War and to serve as the font of civil rights that
inhered from that relationship.80 The Citizenship Clause states strongly
75. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 872 (1986). See also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench,
The Idealogical Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 263 (1984)
(“Both the expansion of national power and the growing significance of national allegiance became
evident early in the war.”).
76. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 873. See also Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at
277 (asserting that after the Civil War, “the concept of national citizenship became triumphant”);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1097 (2001) (“The Reconstruction Amendments were designed to create a new constitutional
order in which state sovereignty would be limited by federal civil rights protections.”)
77. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 54 (“To Republicans the great objects of the Civil War and
Reconstruction were securing liberty and protecting the rights of citizens of the United States.”).
See also SMITH, supra note 19, at 286 (arguing that the three constitutional amendments and six
major civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era “compromised the most extensive restructuring
of American citizenship”).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
80. See James W. Fox Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 145 (2002) (“[S]upporters
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to enable Congress to enforce equality in a wide range of
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and unequivocally that there is only one class of United States citizens;
the Privileges or Immunities Clause clarifies that those citizens have
certain rights that cannot be denied to them due to the very nature of
their federal citizenship.81 The Clauses also reflect the re-structuring of
the federalist system during Reconstruction, shifting the balance of
power in favor of the federal government and away from the states, and
making Congress the primary protector of civil rights.82
Interestingly, the version of the Fourteenth Amendment that was
approved by the House of Representatives did not contain the
Citizenship Clause, which was added only upon debate in the Senate.
After Senator Howard introduced the Amendment, Senator Benjamin F.
Wade suggested an amendment to identify those whose privileges and
immunities were protected. That amendment was the Citizenship
Clause.83 However, the Citizenship Clause was added late, not because
it was not important, but because it reflected the understanding of the
framers so widespread that those in the House felt that it was not
necessary.84 For example, as discussed above, Bingham believed that
public activity because such activities were themselves privileges of national citizenship.”). The
framers also intended the citizenship clause to overrule the Court’s decision in Dred Scott that freed
slaves could not be citizens, and to establish birthright citizenship.
81. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress attempted to enforce
federal civil rights through the Civil Rights Act of 1866. However, some proponents of the Act
feared that they lacked constitutional authority to enforce those rights. The debate over Congress’
constitutional authority to enact the Civil Rights Act led to the drafting and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a sound constitutional basis for the Act. In effect, therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act. See Farber & Muench, supra note
75, at 275 (“The general theory of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866] was that Congress had the same
power to protect citizens at home [as abroad] . . . . [The framers] believed that the fourteenth
amendment supplied the missing authority to protect basic human rights.”).
82. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 866-67; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277. See
also J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2347 (1997) (“The citizenship
clause is a second Declaration of Independence, announcing that equal citizenship would henceforth
be available to all regardless of race or prior condition of servitude.”); Fox, supra note 49, at 425
(“The framers of Reconstruction believed that, by making a clear statement about citizenship,
federalism could assume its proper role in the service of citizens.”); see also Farber & Muench,
supra note 75, at 236 (“The fourteenth amendment was intended to bridge the gap between positive
law and higher law by empowering the national government to protect the natural rights of its
citizens.”).
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
84. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 91 (“So for Republicans the amendment was simply
declaratory of existing constitutional law, properly understood. They rejected Dred Scott and
instead believed that all free persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States.”);
SMITH, supra note 19, at 306 (The architects of the Civil Rights Act and Attorney General Edward
Bates believed that native-born blacks were already citizens). See also Richard L. Aynes,
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the SlaughterHouse Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 649 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause was “added in
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the freed slaves were already citizens of the United States,
notwithstanding the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott, and did not need a
constitutional amendment to make them so.85
The Citizenship Clause was most likely added by the Senate as a
result of a debate over whether Congress had the power to declare freed
slaves as citizens in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. A number of Senators
questioned whether Congress had the power to make such a declaration
in light of the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott. For example, Senator Peter
Van Winkle of West Virginia, and a member of the Unconditional
Unionist Party, asked where Congress had the power to make Africans
citizens of the United States.86 Similarly, Senator Johnson of Maryland
argued that Congress lacked the authority to create birthright citizenship
because in slave states, slaves were not considered citizens even if they
were born there.87 Other oppoenents of Reconstruction countered that
“enfranchisement of those unfit for republican citizenship” were
antithetical to republicanism.88 The Citizenship Clause rejects this
argument and firmly overrules Dred Scott, establishes birthright
citizenship, and makes it clear that Congress has the power to protect the
rights of federal citizens.
Even though the Citizenship Clause was added late, its importance
is reflected in the fact that it is the first clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is not surprising, given that early congressional
discussion of the newly proposed Fourteenth Amendment emphasized
the rights of citizenship.89 For example, Senator Fessenden of Maine,
speaking for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated that the goal
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the equal participation of all in the
rights of citizenship.90 Others wanted it to protect “the rights and
privileges of citizens,”91 “the personal and natural rights of citizens,”92

the Senate at the last moment to write into the Constitution the antislavery view that the Thirteenth
Amendment granted citizenship along with freedom”).
85. See generally, CURTIS, supra note 18, at 91.
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1777 (1866) (Johnson) (“[W]hat doubt can there be
but that if a State possessed the power to declare who should be her citizens before the Constitution
was adopted that power remains now as absolute and conclusive as it was when the Constitution
was adopted?”).
88. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 296.
89. CURTIS, supra note 18. (“In proposing his amendment, Bingham wanted to ensure that the
provisions of article IV, section 2, were respected in each state.”).
90. Id.
91. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 868 (1866) (Newell).
92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1032 (1866) (McClurg).
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the “fundamental rights of citizens,”93 and the civil rights of citizens.94
The primary function of the Fourteenth Amendment is defining and
protecting the rights of federal citizens.
C. The Importance of Congressional Enforcement
Perhaps most important to John Bingham was the change in the
39th Congress’ vision of its own institutional role, in protecting the
rights of its citizens, that is reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the Constitution did not
contain a single provision assigning this role to Congress. Additionally,
the Bill of Rights does not contain any congressional enforcement
provision. In contrast, all of the Reconstruction Amendments contain
congressional enforcement provisions, as does every postReconstruction Amendment that expands individual rights.95 The
Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments intended to bestow broad
power on Congress to define and protect the rights of national
citizenship by enacting civil rights legislation.96 The Fourteenth
Amendment thus represents a major departure from the constitutional
protections for individual rights prior to the Civil War in two significant
respects—it protects those rights from infringement by the states and it
names Congress as the principle enforcer of those rights.97
Congressional power to enforce the rights of its citizens was a
crucial component of Bingham’s theory of citizenship.98 Prior to the
93. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295 (1866) (Wilson).
94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866) (Pomeroy).
95. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (abolishing slavery and giving Congress the power to
“enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XIV; XV (prohibiting the federal government and
states from denying the right to vote on account of race and giving Congress the power to “enforce
this article by appropriate legislation”); XIX (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on account
of sex and giving Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XXIII
(bestowing the right to vote for president on residents of the District of Columbia and giving
Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XXIV (prohibiting the use
of poll taxes as a voting qualification and giving Congress the power to “enforce this article by
appropriate legislation”); XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen and giving Congress the power
to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”).
96. See Julius Chambers, Protection of Civil Rights: A Constitutional Mandate for the
Federal Government, 87 MICH L. REV. 1599, 1604-05 (1989) (“The thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution created a national citizenry, defined the rights of citizenship, and
authorized the national government to protect those rights. . . . The framers of the Reconstruction
amendments meant to vest the federal government the authority necessary to secure civil rights and
to provide federal remedies when those rights were denied.”).
97. See Fox, supra note 49, at 512 (“Congress saw itself, and not the Court or the states, as
the governmental branch best suited to define the particulars of citizenship.”).
98. Aynes, supra note 14, at 71.
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Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham believed that the rights of federal
citizenship had a substantive component, including the Bill of Rights,
and that those rights were enforceable against the states.99 To Bingham,
the problem was that those rights lacked a remedy because Congress
lacked the power to enforce them.100 Two years before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, Bingham made his theory of enforcement
clear, speaking in general terms about what was to become the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Bingham explained that this “general”
amendment would give Congress the express power to enforce “the
rights which were guarantied (sic) . . . from the beginning, but which
guarantee unhappily has been disregarded by more than one state of this
Union . . . simply because of want of power in Congress to enforce that
guarantee.”101
Ensuring congressional power to protect the rights of federal
citizens was arguably the raison d’etre of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress had freed people from slavery, and given itself power to
enforce those provisions, in the Thirteenth Amendment.102 Soon
thereafter, many southern states attempted to perpetuate the institution of
slavery in all but name by enacting laws commonly known as the Black
Codes, which denied freed slaves the right to vote, to own property, to
appear in court, and other basic rights of citizenship, treating them as
second-class citizens.103 According to the Report of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, these laws made it necessary for Congress to inquire
into what it could do to secure the civil and political rights of freed
slaves.104
The Committee recommended enacting a Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution to ensure congressional power to protect
those rights.105
99. Id. at 70-71.
100. Id. at 71.
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1866).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
103. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Exec Doc. No. 2 (1865) (Schurz Report
on Condition of the South; predicting that southern states would try to reinstate slavery-like
conditions such as peonage); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Senator
Trumbull). See also Smith, supra note 13, at 752 (southern states used Black Code to make newly
freed slaves into second class citizens); Fox, supra note 49, at 490 (noting the context of
Reconstruction, where “real people had been denied basic human dignity and citizenship”). See
also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388
(1992) (maintaining that when people were talking about abridging privileges or immunities in
1866, they were mostly talking about the Black Codes).
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report No. 112 (1866) (Joint Committee on
Reconstruction) (proposing a Fourteenth Article of Amendment).
105. Id. See also Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 275 (“The general theory of the Civil
Rights Act [of 1866] was that Congress had the same power to protect citizens at home [as
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Simultaneously with the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress enacted a Civil Rights Act106 providing that “All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State or Territory” to
engage in real property transactions, make and enforce contracts, and
have the right to “the full and equal benefit of the laws.”107 Some
members of Congress believed that the Thirteenth Amendment was
sufficient to give Congress power to enact the legislation needed to
secure those rights.108 For example, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,
who served as both a Democrat and a Republican, argued that depriving
a citizen of civil rights creates a badge of servitude and that prohibiting
such a practice was within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment.109
Similarly, Representative M. Russell Thayer,
Republican of Pennsylvania, insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment
and the Fifth Amendment gave Congress the power to enact the civil
rights bill.110 While Bingham was a strong supporter of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, stating that he wanted the Federal Bill of Rights to be
enforced “everywhere,”111 Bingham was one of few Republicans that
thought Congress lacked the power to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1866, absent the Fourteenth Amendment.112 Based in large part on
Bingham’s concerns, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
eventually decided that enacting this Amendment would be the best
approach to ensure the constitutionality of proposed civil rights
legislation.113
abroad] . . . [the framers] believed that the fourteenth amendment supplied the missing authority to
protect basic human rights.”).
106. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) now codified at 42 U.S.C. §1982.
107. Id. The original version considered by Congress also provided that all persons born in the
United States would be citizens of the United States. That portion of the bill was omitted after the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made it unnecessary.
108. See Samuel Estreicher, Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 452 (1974).
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866); CURTIS, supra note 18, at 79. James
Wilson, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, also thought that the Bill of Rights, and especially
the Due Process Clause, gave Congress the power to pass the Civil Rights Bill before the
Thirteenth Amendment. He said that citizens of the United States were entitled to “certain rights”
and being entitled to those rights, “it is the duty of the government to protect citizens in the perfect
enjoyment of them.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866). See CURTIS, supra note 18,
at 81.
111. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
112. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (Representative Bingham) (arguing
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to enact the Civil Rights Act); CURTIS, supra note 18,
at 81.
113. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 86. (pointing out that several congressmen observed that the
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Many members of Congress argued that congressional power was
necessary to ensure that those guarantees would be implemented. For
example, Senator Trumbull stated that ensuring congressional power to
enforce the rights of citizenship was crucial because “[t]here is very little
importance in the general declaration of abstract truths and principles
unless they can be carried into effect, unless the persons who are to be
affected by them have some means of availing themselves of those
benefits.”114 Similarly, Congressman Ignatius Donnelly, speaking in
favor of the proposed amendment, argued:
Why should this not pass? Are the promises of the Constitution mere
verbiage? Are its sacred pledges of life, liberty and property to fall to
the ground through lack of power to enforce them? Or shall that great
Constitution be what its founders meant it to be, a shield and a
protection over the head of the lowliest and poorest citizen in the
remotest region of the nation?115

In addition, William Lawrence of Ohio, a widely respected lawyer
and former judge, argued that Congress had the incidental power to
enforce and protect civil rights.116 Lawrence said:
The Constitution declares these rights to be inherent in every citizen,
and Congress has the power to enforce the declaration. If it does not,
then the declaration of rights is in vain, and we have a government
powerless to secure or protect rights which the Constitution solemnly
declares every citizen shall have.117

That congressional enforcement power was predominant in the
minds of the framers is evident from the fact that the first draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment that John Bingham presented to Congress was
not self-executing, but relied solely on congressional enforcement.118
Fourteenth Amendment would eliminate any question about the power of Congress to pass the Civil
Rights bill). See also, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866) (Broomall); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (Eliot); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH
OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 447 (2002) (Section 5 “would
be the justification for the sweeping measures that Congress adopted in its efforts to rebuild the
South.”); Estreicher, supra note 108, at 498.
114. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
115. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 586 (1866).
116. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 78.
117. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835 (1866).
118. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). It said only “The Congress shall have
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, and to all persons in the several states
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property.” Id. (Presented to Congress by Bingham
on Feb. 26, 1866). In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy viewed the change in language as
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Moreover, the framers had a very broad view of congressional
power in mind when they enacted the enforcement provisions of the
Reconstruction Amendments. The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation
of congressional power in McCulloch v. Maryland119 remained the
standard on congressional enforcement power throughout the
Antebellum Era, and the framers consciously invoked its broad meaning
when they authorized Congress to enact “appropriate” legislation in
Section five to enforce the rights established by Section one of the
Amendment.120 The Court had relied on McCulloch in its broad reading
of congressional power to legislate against the rights of fleeing slaves
and their protectors in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.121 Throughout the
ratification debates, Republican supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment referred to Prigg to argue that Section one of the
Amendment, including the Citizenship Clause, gave Congress implied
powers to protect freed slaves.122 Some framers even believed that
Prigg meant that the Fourteenth Amendment was unnecessary because
the existence of rights necessarily meant that Congress had the power to
enforce them.123 The framers intended to turn Prigg on its head,
proof that Congress did not intend to give itself broad enforcement power. 521 U.S. 507, 523-28
(1997). However, Kennedy’s point in Boerne is inconsistent with the overwhelming evidence that
Congress intended to give itself broad enforcement power. See infra, notes 121-29 and
accompanying text.
119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding that the “Necessary and Proper” Clause of Article
I authorized Congress to enact any legislation that was “appropriate” to furthering a “legitimate
end”). “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” Id. at 421.
120. See Amar, supra note 22, at 825 n.299.
121. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842) (upholding Congress’ power to enact a fugitive slave
law pursuant to its Article IV enforcement powers, even though the Fugitive Slave Clause did not
contain an enforcement provision, stating “[i]f indeed, the constitution guaranties the right . . . the
natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority
and functions to enforce it.”). See Amar, supra note 22, at 69. See also Finkelman, supra note 23,
at 614 (arguing that “the structure of the Constitution, as well as nineteenth-century notions of
Congressional power suggest that Congress may have lacked the power to enact the 1793 law”).
See also id. at 658 (arguing that Justice “Story’s main concern in Prigg was to strengthen federal
power at the expense of the states, in disregard of the rights of northern free blacks”). Congress
later enacted the more broadly sweeping Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, upheld by the Court in
Ablemon v. Booth. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 526 (1858). Congress relied on Prigg when enacting the
later, more comprehensive law. Amar, supra note 22, at 26, 70.
122. Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 139 (1999).
123. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1153 (1866) (Thayer); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1866) (Thayer). See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (Lawrence). See CURTIS, supra note 18, at
82. But see Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-
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protecting the rights of those freed from slavery with the very powers
once used to enslave.124
Finally, members of Congress during Reconstruction made it clear
that they understood their Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to
be used primarily to define and protect the rights of citizenship. For
example, during the debate over the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of
1871,125 Representative Shellaberger, Republican of Ohio who
participated in the 1866 debates over the Amendment, asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to “legislate directly
for enforcement of such rights as are fundamental elements of
citizenship.”126
Similarly, in 1872 Senator Matthew Carpenter,
Republican of Wisconsin who joined Congress the year after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, argued that the Amendment’s
enforcement power “included the power to enforce national privileges
and immunities, because the assertion of national citizenship and the
mention of national privileges and immunities implied their
existence.”127 Though these members of Congress may have disagreed
about the extent of the rights of federal citizenship,128 they all accepted
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment had given them the power to
define and enforce those rights.
II. THE RIGHTS OF FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP
What rights of federal citizenship did the framers intend to protect?
To the framers, federal citizenship had both a structural and a
substantive component. Structurally, federal citizenship was intended to
guarantee that the fundamental rights of citizenship would be uniform
throughout the country. The substantive meaning of citizenship rights is
more difficult to discern. The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
directly follows the Citizenship Clause, was at least intended to
Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 435, 453-56 (1981).
124. This interpretation of Prigg is not necessarily inconsistent with the intent of the author of
the opinion of the Court, Justice Story, who arguably saw Prigg primarily as a case about the power
of Congress, not the extension of slavery. See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 608 (describing Prigg
as “a proslavery opinion written by a Justice personally opposed to slavery but driven by a desire to
nationalize all law, including the law of slavery.”).
125. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69 (1871). See also, Fox, supra note 80, at
127-28.
127. Fox, supra note 80, at 143 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1872)). The
statements of Senator Carpenter here are ironic, given that he served as counsel for the state of
Louisiana in The Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Id. at 142.
128. See id. at 137-48.
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incorporate the Bill of Rights and make it enforceable against the states,
and there is considerable evidence that many of the framers thought the
Privileges or Immunities of citizenship to encompass a “natural rights”
theory of the fundamental rights of citizenship.129 The issue of
incorporation has been hotly debated by a number of scholars.130 But the
approach of this essay is to focus on what the framers understood the
term “citizen” to mean and what rights they intended to be encompassed
within that concept, because the framers explicitly linked the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to the rights of citizenship.131 Evidence from the
Ratification debates and contemporaneous legal doctrine indicates that
the framers viewed the meaning of federal citizenship very broadly and
that the rights that adhered to citizenship were considerably broader than
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Most importantly, the framers
intended future Congresses to define citizenship rights expansively when
exercising their enforcement power under Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.132
A. The Ratification Debates
With the Citizenship Clause, the framers overturned the Court’s
ruling in Dred Scott, made freed slaves into citizens who belonged to the
national political community and guaranteed to them the protection of
the federal government. When Bingham and the other framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment spoke of citizenship, what they wanted most
was to create uniform federal rights that would not vary from state to
state. Prior to the Civil War, the basic rights of citizens of one state did
129. See Farber & Muensch, supra note 75; Fox, supra note 80.
130. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 18; 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1089-95 (1953); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does incorporate the Bill of Rights). But see Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of
Rights because it has no clear meaning); Lino A. Graglia, Interpreting the Constitution: Posner on
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1033-34 (1992) (“[T]here is very little basis for the implausible
proposition that the states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment understood that it would
‘incorporate’ the Bill of Rights, making its restrictions applicable to the states. . . .”); Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar’s Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993)
(arguing against Amar’s incorporation theory). Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had
ruled that the Bill of Rights was not intended to limit the states in the case of Barron v. Baltimore.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
131. The Court in Saenz v. Roe, followed this approach. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Emphasizing
the fundamental nature of the right to travel, the Court pointed out that “[t]he Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence.” Id. at 506.
132. See supra, notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
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not extend beyond the borders of that state.133 The Citizenship Clause
reflects the framers’ view of a more inclusive national political
community, where it was only necessary to be born to become a
member.
Also, that national community had the responsibility to protect all
of its members in exchange for their allegiance to that community.134
This theory of citizenship reflected the “social compact” theory of John
Locke, that people submit to the authority of the government in return
for its protection.135 Consistent with this theory, an influential treatise at
the time, the 1873 edition of Justice Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution defined a “citizen” as “a person owing allegiance to the
government, and entitled to protection from it.”136 Thus, in protest of
President Johnson’s veto of the first Civil Rights Act of 1866,137
Representative Lyman Trumbull argued that citizens are entitled to
protection within the United States, as well as abroad, stating,
“allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.”138
Finally, the framers intended that the rights of federal citizens
should be equal throughout the country. The theme of equality of rights
directly reflects the concerns of expressed by northern members of
Congress in debates over the rights of citizenship prior to the Civil War.
Prior to the Civil War, those members of Congress were outraged that
citizens of one state could be denied their most basic rights by another
state139 and they intended the Fourteenth Amendment to rectify this
133. For example, prior to the Civil War, South Carolina could imprison people of color who
were citizens of other states solely because they entered South Carolina. Id. Oregon could exclude
people of color and deny them the right to own property, enter into contracts or sue in state courts.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
134. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 878 (Republicans felt “a general obligation to secure
the rights of Americans because they believed that in return for an allegiance to government,
citizens were entitled to the protection of the government.”); Fox, supra note 49, at 504 (Congress
enacted the Freedman’s Bureau legislation based on the theory that the federal government should
reward the good citizenship of those who were loyal to the Union during the Civil War). This
theory of citizenship reflected the “social compact” theory of John Locke, who believed that people
submit to the authority of the government in return for its protection. See Smith, supra note 13, at
695. Hence, the 1873 edition of Justice Story’s famous Commentaries on the Constitution defined a
“citizen” as “a person owing allegiance to the government, and entitled to protection from it.” 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 654 (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., Little, Brown, & Co., London 4th ed. 1873).
135. See Smith, supra note 13, at 695; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 241.
136. STORY, supra note 134, at 654.
137. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). See also Farber & Muench, supra note
72, at 275 (“[The framers] believed that the Fourteenth Amendment supplied the missing authority
to protect basic human rights.”).
139. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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situation by creating a baseline of rights that would be uniform
throughout the country. Thus, that the rights of citizenship should be
equal regardless of the state of one’s residence was expressed not only in
the Equal Protection Clause, but also in the notion of citizenship itself.140
The record is less clear with regard to which substantive rights the
framers had in mind.141 However, a general paradigm emerges from the
congressional debates at the time. John Bingham and other antislavery
constitutionalists believed that the privileges and immunities of
citizenship, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, at least included
the Bill of Rights.142 Thus, in March 1871, Bingham noted that the Bill
of Rights “chiefly defined” the privileges and immunities of
citizenship.143 Also, there is ample evidence that the framers at least
intended to protect the trio of rights referred to in the Declaration of
Independence, the right to life, liberty and property. For example, in a
debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1866,144 Representative William
Lawrence of Ohio stated, [t]here are certain absolute rights which
pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a state cannot
constitutionally deprive him . . . the absolute right to live, the right of
personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property.”145 Included in the meaning of “liberty” were the freedoms of
speech and religion that southern states had denied too many citizens
prior to the Civil War.146
As expressed in the debates over the Negroes Seamen’s Acts147 and
the admission of Oregon,148 the antislavery constitutionalists who later
became the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also believed that
access to government facilities, such as courts149 and the right to enter
140. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 251 (noting the framers were heavily influenced
by vision of equality). Senator Howard, when introducing Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the floor of Congress, declared that Section one “establishes equality before the law, and it gives
to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights as it gives the most
powerful, the most wealthy, the most haughty.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866);
Fox, supra note 49, at 520 n.357.
141. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277 (stating that the difficult part about
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment is determining which fundamental rights the framers
intended to protect).
142. See Aynes, supra note 14, at 71.
143. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 84 (1871).
144. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
145. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866).
146. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277; CURTIS, supra note 17, at 76.
147. See supra, notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
148. See supra, notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
149. See also Smith, supra note 13, at 802 (framers of Fourteenth Amendment wished to
establish the right to sue in federal courts, pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, as a right of
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into legal contracts, as well as the right to travel, were privileges and
immunities of citizenship. However, a majority of the framers did not
see the right to vote as a right of citizenship.150 They differentiated
“civil rights,” centering on the right to participate in the legal system in
such basic means as entering into contracts and owning real property,
from “political” rights like the right to vote. Only the former “civil”
rights were considered to adhere to federal citizenship.
There is also considerable evidence that some framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended the rights of citizenship to be
considerably broader, encompassing all fundamental human rights and
linking those rights to national citizenship.151 Prior to the Civil War,
John Bingham had argued that the rights of citizens included “the
equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to
utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their
toil . . . the rock on which that Constitution rests.”152 Others went even
further, propounding a “natural law” view of citizenship rights that
encompassed all fundamental rights. For example, when Senator
Howard introduced Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Senate, he indicated that in order to find the privileges or immunities of
federal citizenship, one should look to the Bill of Rights and to the
Circuit Court’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,153 a lower court case that
was well known for embodying a broad, natural rights theory of
citizenship.154 Similarly, Senator Lyman Trumbull declared in a debate
over the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: “To be a citizen of
the United States carries with it some rights, and what are they? They
are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens as
citizenship).
150. SMITH, supra note 19, at 306; Curtis, supra note 18. Enacted in 1870, the Fifteenth
Amendment extended the right to vote to freed slaves and prohibited states from denying the
franchise “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend XV,
§1. Significantly, that Amendment also included a congressional enforcement provision. U.S.
CONST. amend XV, §2.
151. See Fox, supra note 49, at 503-04 (“For Republicans, fundamental human rights and
American citizenship were closely linked, since America was founded on fundamental human
rights.”); Smith, supra note 13, at 730; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 236 (discussing the
influence of natural law theory on the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
153. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
154. In Corfield, the court articulated a comprehensive list of the fundamental rights of
“citizens of all free governments,” including “[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety. . . . The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state . . . to claim the benefit of writ of habeas corpus . . . [and] to institute and maintain actions of
any kind in the courts of the state.” Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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free men in all countries.”155
That many of the framers believed in natural rights does not mean
that they intended the rights of federal citizenship to be unlimited. As
even Senator Trumbull’s remarks make clear, those rights must be
linked with citizenship in some way in order to be enforceable through
the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, a congressional provision
defining the standards for divorce procedures would clearly not fit
within the citizenship framework, nor would a federal law criminalizing
pick-pocketing.
Nevertheless, congressional debates during the
Reconstruction Era, as well as legislation that Congress enacted during
that period, reveal that Congress intended the Citizenship Clause and
rights of federal citizenship to be a broad font of nationally uniform
individual rights. Congressional debates also reveal that the framers
intended Congress to play an active role in defining those rights through
legislation.
B. Reconstruction Era Legislation
The most concrete expression of the framer’s understanding of the
rights of citizenship can be found in the civil rights legislation that they
enacted contemporaneously to the Fourteenth Amendment. Those
statutes are replete with the language of citizenship and the rights that
adhere thereto. For example, in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress
declared that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State or Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property.”156 The Act also guaranteed “all persons” in the United States
“the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and
equal benefit of the laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”157 The Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871 prohibited conspiracies by state or private actors
to prevent a person from “exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States. . . .”158 Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
prohibited race discrimination in privately owned places of public
accommodation, was titled “[A]n act to protect all citizens in their civil
155. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
156. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The original version considered by
Congress also provided that all persons born in the United States would be citizens of the United
States. That portion of the Bill was omitted after the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment made it unnecessary.
157. 16 Stat. 144 (1870) now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
158. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2(3), 17 Stat 13 (1871), codified in Rev. Stat. of
1874, § 1980, now 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
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and legal rights.”159 That portions of both the 1871 and the 1875 Acts
applied to private conduct indicates that immediately following the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of Congress
believed that their power to protect the rights of citizenship was not
limited to state action.160
The civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era reflected the
themes of belonging, protection and equality that resound throughout the
framer’s discussion of the rights of citizenship. The 1866 Civil Rights
Act161 enabled all citizens to participate in basic legal processes, such as
entering into contracts and using the court system, that would facilitate
their belonging to their community. During the Reconstruction Era,
members of Congress repeatedly referred to the right to own property
and enter into contract as a basic right of citizenship because citizens
were entitled to participate in the legal structure.162 That some states had
denied free persons of color access to their legal systems had prevented
them from belonging to the legal polity.
Protection was the theme of the 1871 Enforcement Act,163 which
made it a crime to interfere with a citizen’s exercise of his rights of
citizenship. Throughout Congressional debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment, the framers repeated their desire to protect the freed slaves,
and other federal citizens, from infringement of their rights.164 For
example, the 1871 Act165 responded to massive organized race based
violence in the southern states, and thus is commonly known as the Klu
Klux Klan Act.166 Members of Congress were concerned that states

159. 18 Stat. 335. The Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in Civil Rights
Cases, stating that it was beyond Congress’ Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers because it
was not directly related to slavery, and that it was beyond Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power because it applied to private, not state action. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In one of the
strongest articulations of the rights of citizenship by any member of the Court in that era, Justice
Harlan vociferously dissented. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
retrospect, as with his dissent to Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (arguing that “separate
but equal” Jim Crow laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
Justice Harlan’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases was undoubtedly
the correct one. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court recently
relied on the majority opinion of the Civil Rights Cases to support its holding in Morrison that
Congress’s authorization of suits against private individuals in the Violence Against Women Act
fell beyond its Section five enforcement power. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
160. Fox, supra note 80, at 135-36 (pointing out that the 1871 Act applies to private conduct).
161. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
162. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
163. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
164. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
165. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
166. See Fox, supra note 80, at 126.
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were not actively prosecuting the instigators of this violence, so they
created federal causes of action, hoping to use the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to protect their citizens from that violence when the states
would not. 167 The Klu Klux Klan Act made it a federal crime for private
individuals or state actors to conspire to deprive citizens of their right to
vote, serve on juries, and obtain equal protection of the law.168 Members
of Congress clearly believed that the Fourteenth Amendment gave them
the power to protect their citizens in this fashion. For example, the
principle proponent of the Act, Representative Shellabarger emphasized
the establishment of national citizenship in the Citizenship Clause and
argued that “to legislate directly for enforcement of such rights are
fundamental elements of citizenship.”169 Other members of Congress
shared Shellabarger’s view of the scope of congressional power to
protect the rights of citizenship.170
Finally, the theme of equality of rights, expressed by the framers as
they introduced the Fourteenth Amendment,171 is reflected throughout
the Reconstruction Era civil rights acts, which were intended to ensure
that United States citizens had equal rights regardless of where they
lived or traveled. The Civil Rights Act of 1875172 took that theme one
step further, attempting to equalize the rights of citizens in their private
transactions. The 1875 Act indicates a very broad view of citizenship
rights, prohibiting race discrimination even in the “social” realm.173
Moreover, the 1875 Act provided that the freedom from race
discrimination was such a fundamental right of citizenship that its
denial, even by private parties, would be a federal offense. 174

167. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 158 (“The denial of equal protection by local officials was a
major problem that concerned the Republicans,” and the reason why Congress decided to provide
direct federal protection).
168. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69 (1871).
170. See Fox, supra note 80, at 127, citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871)
(statement of Representative Hoar) (“Congress is empowered by the fourteenth amendment to pass
all ‘appropriate legislation’ to secure the privileges and immunities of the citizen.”).
171. See supra, note 82.
172. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
173. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 113, at 481 (noting the Civil Rights Act of 1875
was “aimed to protect the freedmen from deprivation of the minimal rights of citizenship.”).
174. See Fox, supra note 80, at 137 (arguing that supporters of the 1875 Act saw it as
implementing the privileges and immunities of federal citizenship). That Act created civil and
criminal liability for violations. The Court struck down that Act in the Civil Rights Cases, reading a
state action requirement into Congress’ Section five enforcement powers. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See
infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
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III. THE FADING VISION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Unfortunately, that broad vision of citizenship rights and
congressional power has been lost over time, and since Reconstruction
Congress has not expressly relied on its power to define the rights of
citizenship. What happened to the vision of the framers? Much of the
decline of this vision is attributable to the post-Reconstruction
retrenchment of the political branches of federal government,175
especially after the compromise of 1876 when President Rutherford B.
Hayes agreed to pull northern troops out of the south, putting an end to
Reconstruction, in exchange for his election to President.176 The
Supreme Court also played a major role in squelching congressional
enthusiasm in two important rulings, The Slaughter-House Cases177 and
The Civil Rights Cases.178 In The Slaughter-House Cases the Court
rejected Senator Howard’s broad, natural rights view of the rights of
federal citizenship, reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment more narrowly than intended by the Framers.179
In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress’ power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying state
action.180 These rulings help to explain why Congress has abandoned its
earlier vision of federal citizenship as a font of congressionally
enforceable rights. However, closer scrutiny of these cases reveals that
neither ruling prevents Congress from resurrecting its vision now.
A. The Slaughter-House Cases
In The Slaughter-House Cases the Court rejected the broadest,
175. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 260-61 (describing President Andrew Johnson’s
measures to undermine Reconstruction); SMITH, supra note 19, at 302.
176. See FONER, supra note 51, at 577 (chapter 12).
177. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
178. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court’s ruling in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)
that the right of peaceable assembly and the right to bear arms were not privileges secured by the
14th Amendment and in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), that the Seventh Amendment right
to trial by jury was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship, also caused Congress to adopt a much
more restrictive view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause by 1876. CURTIS, supra note 18, at
170.
179. See Aynes, supra note 84, at 627 (“‘[E]veryone’ agrees [that] the Court [in SlaughterHouse] incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause. . . .”). But see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1063
(2000) (arguing that Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House was a compromise ruling
that left open the possibility of incorporation of the Bill of Rights and was consistent with the intent
of the framers).
180. 109 U.S. at 15.
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natural rights theory of the privileges and immunities of citizenship held
by some framers of the Fourteenth Amendment when it held that those
rights did not include the right to pursue an occupation, but maintain the
view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the rights of
federal citizenship.181 The Court held that states, not the federal
government, have the responsibility of defining and protecting the
Slaughter-House was not an
fundamental rights of citizens.182
interpretation of congressional enforcement power under Section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but of the self-enforcing provisions of
Section one. Thus, on its face it does not limit congressional power to
enforce the privileges and immunities of citizenship. However, the fact
that the Court expressed a more restrictive view of the rights of
citizenship than was held by many of the framers may very well have
placed a damper on congressional enforcement of those rights following
the Slaughter-House ruling.
Professor James Fox has recently argued that Slaughter-House had
a significant impact on congressional debates about civil rights
legislation immediately following the Court’s ruling.183 Fox points out
that the first version of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,184 which prohibited
race discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodation,
was introduced in 1870, and was heavily debated in Congress
throughout the period. After the Court’s opinion in Slaughter-House,
opponents of the Bill argued that it now fell outside Congress’ power to
protect the privileges or immunities of citizenship, because of Justice
Miller’s narrow interpretation of those rights in Slaughter-House.185 In
response, supporters argued that freedom from discrimination remained
a right of federal citizenship, emphasizing the equality based nature of
citizenship rights.186 However, Fox is doubtless correct when he points
out that Slaughter-House played an important role in “effect(ing) the
181. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 659 (2000). The link between the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the rights of federal citizenship is apparent from the fact that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause directly follows the Citizenship Clause and refers to the “Privileges or
Immunities of citizens of the United States.” Id. Moreover, the framers relied on their
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in their theory of federal
citizenship which is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text.
182. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873).
183. See Fox, supra note 80, at 148-55.
184. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
185. Id. at 148.
186. See CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3452-54 (1874) (statement of Senator
Frelinghuysen), cited in Fox, supra note 80, at 149.
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subtle elimination of fundamental privileges of national citizenship from
the congressional and national political discourse over the Fourteenth
Amendment and Reconstruction.”187
Fox points out that Slaughter-House caused members of Congress
to steer away from the broad, natural rights view of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship, and to pay more attention to the Equal
Protection Clause as a source of equal rights.188 However, as this article
has pointed out, equality of rights was a driving theme behind the
framers’ vision of national citizenship rights.189 Thus, the language and
vision of citizenship rights survived in the final version of the 1875
Act.190 This is consistent with the argument that the Court’s ruling in
Slaughter-House may be a less restrictive reading of federal citizenship
than is generally recognized.191 On further reflection, Justice Miller’s
majority opinion appears to be a compromise between eviscerating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and adopting the plaintiff’s broad
natural law theory. The Court held instead that the Clause does not
protect all rights, only uniquely federal rights.192 Bryan Wildenthal has
argued that Slaughter-House merely rejected the natural rights theory of
the plaintiffs but did not necessarily reject the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the
states.193 Even without addressing the issue of Miller’s views on
incorporation, however, it is apparent that Miller’s opinion does not
necessarily place significant limits on the rights of federal citizenship.
In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller distinguished between the rights
187. Fox, supra note 80, at 155. Moreover, after Slaughter-House, the Court issued a series of
opinions narrowing its views of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, culminating in a list of federal
citizenship rights in the case of Twining v. New Jersey. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Many commentators
consider this list paltry and redundant, and may have further dampened congressional interest in
developing the privileges and immunities of citizenship. For an excellent discussion of the
development of the Court’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause from SlaughterHouse to Twining, see Bryan Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation
of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (2000).
188. Fox, supra note 80, at 149-50 (“Even among the more forceful defenders of the Bill,
therefore, Slaughter-House effected a rhetorical shift away from a fundamental or natural rights
position and toward a mere equality approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”).
189. Supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
190. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
191. Aynes, supra note 84, at 661. See Newsom, supra note 181, at 659 (arguing that if the
Court had ruled on their behalf, the ruling could have been interpreted as “a wholesale transfer of
authority over individual rights—including traditional, common-law rights of contract and
property—from the states to the federal government.”); Wildenthal, supra note 179 (arguing that
Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House did not reject the view that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states).
192. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. 36.
193. See Wildenthal, supra note 179.
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of state and federal citizenship, holding that “fundamental rights,” such
as the right to enter into a profession of one’s choice, argued by the
plaintiffs in that case, were rights of state citizenship rather than federal
citizenship. Upon reflection, Miller’s opinion seems to have merely
rejected the broadest, natural rights view of federal citizenship, while
maintaining a fairly broad view of the rights of federal citizenship. The
federal rights that Justice Miller identified as protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in his SlaughterHouse opinion are those that have direct links to federal citizenship.
They include rights “which owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”194 In
dicta, Miller supplied a non-exhaustive list of some rights of federal
citizenship, including the right “to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices,
and to engage in administering its functions, and [t]he right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances.” 195
The Slaughter-House list emphasizes the themes of belonging and
protection that had influenced the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the importance of citizens’ participation in their
government. Thus, while the Court in Slaughter-House rejected a
wholesale fundamental rights theory of federal civil rights, it did not
purport to restrict the rights of federal citizenship. Consistent with this
reading of Slaughter-House, the Court has since found the right to vote
in federal elections,196 the right to appear in federal court,197 the right to
petition the federal government,198 and the right to travel199 to be federal
citizenship rights.

194. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
195. Id. at 79-80 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867)).
196. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 328-29 (1941).
197. See Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 531-32 (1922).
198. See, e.g, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939) (noting the right to
assemble to discuss national legislation and the rights and benefits to accrue citizens therefrom);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (recognizing the right to petition Congress).
199. Most recently, the Court found the right to travel to be a citizenship right protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1997). The Court had
previously found the right to travel to be a protected citizenship right in numerous cases, without
identifying the constitutional source of that right. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (striking down a California statute that
criminalized the entrance of a pauper into the state as violating the right to travel).
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B. The Civil Rights Cases
In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court directly limited congressional
enforcement power when it struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which prohibited “any person” from denying to “any citizen” access to
privately owned places of public accommodation on the basis of race.200
In that case, the Court held that Congress’ power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying state action.201 The
Court articulated a cramped view of congressional power, stating in
dicta that the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt under the
Fourteenth Amendment “is not general legislation upon the rights of the
citizen, but corrective legislation such as may be necessary and proper
for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce.”202 The
state action limitation has proven to be a major barrier to congressional
enforcement of Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.203
However, the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases that better reflects
the intent of the framers is not the majority ruling, but Justice Harlan’s
dissent.204 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,205 the Court had recognized
congressional power to require private parties to return fugitive slaves
even though Article IV referred only to state action.206 In his dissent to
the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan relied on the Prigg ruling to argue
that state action is not required for Congress to enforce the civil rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.207 Harlan pointed out that by

200. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
201. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Court also found that the Act fell beyond
Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment “relates
only to slavery and involuntary servitude.” Id. at 20. However, the Court overruled that aspect of
the Civil Rights Cases in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This question was
over the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. §1982 which was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in real property transactions. In Jones, the
Court found that the bill was a constitutional attempt on the part of Congress to remedy “badges and
incidents” of slavery. Id.
202. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14. The Court later cited this language to support its
holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, that Congress cannot create new substantive constitutional
rights, but is limited to remedying constitutional violations. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
203. See Fox, supra note 80, at 162. For example, in United States v. Morrison, the Court cited
the Civil Rights Cases to support the proposition that civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act, which created a federal cause of action against private individuals who engaged in
gender motivated violence, did not fall within Congress’ Section five power to enforce the equal
protection clause. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
204. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
205. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
206. Amar, supra note 22, at 70.
207. Id. at 53.
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ruling otherwise, the majority created an anomaly.208 Namely, the Court
enabled the Congress to legislate to vindicate slavery, but not to secure
the rights of freed slaves.209 In fact, members of Congress had cited
Prigg during the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act in support of their
power to legislate with regard to private action.210 Congressional power
to enforce civil rights is even clearer than the power it had enjoyed to
derive the rights of fugitive slaves, since Section five is an explicit
congressional empowerment that Article IV lacked.211 Based on this
reasoning, the Citizenship Clause itself may provide an affirmative grant
to Congress to protect the rights of federal citizens against infringement
by private parties. It is possible that the Court would have to overrule
the Civil Rights Cases before Congress could exercise this power against
private parties.212 Nonetheless, the Civil Rights Cases ruling does not
prevent Congress from broadly protect the rights of citizenship against
state infringement.
C. Retrenchment
Finally, the federal civil rights statutes from the Reconstruction Era
failed to deliver their promise of belonging, protection and equality. The
statutes were largely not enforced.213 By the turn of the century, the
Supreme Court found that state sponsored segregation did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson, gutting that provision’s power to bring about racial
justice.214 Jim Crow was in full swing, as was rampant racial violence
against blacks throughout the south. By the turn of the 20th century,
equal citizenship was no longer a realistic alternative for African
Americans. Instead, they were reduced to seeking bare physical
protection against lynching,215 and even that protection was seldom

208. Id.
209. See id. (“The national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the constitution,
do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did, with the
sanction of this Court, for the protection of slavery and the rights of masters of freed slaves.”).
210. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 159.
211. See Amar, supra note 22, at 71.
212. But see infra, notes 274-302 and accompanying text (arguing that the State Action
Requirement might not limit congressional enforcement of the Citizenship Clause).
213. See Chambers, supra note 96, at 1600: (“The national government’s retreat from civil
rights enforcement following Reconstruction and relinquishment of responsibility to state and local
officials led to lawlessness, lynching, and the entrenchment of segregation.”).
214. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
215. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 50 (1999).
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received.216
IV. A LOST OPPORTUNITY TO ENFORCE THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP
During the Reconstruction Era, Congress was motivated by John
Bingham’s vision of national citizenship and enacted a flurry of
legislation to define and protect the rights that adhered thereto. By the
end of the 19th Century, however, Congress appears to have lost that
vision. During the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s, Congress again
enacted wide-reaching legislation to protect the rights of its citizens, but
did not return to its Reconstruction Era vision of national citizenship
rights.217 Proponents of the 1960s legislation relied on not the
Citizenship Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce
Clause for authorization of its legislation.218 Thus, the era was a lost
opportunity for Congress to expansively define the rights of federal
citizenship in accordance with Bingham’s theory of citizenship.
A. 1960s Era Civil Rights Legislation
In 1954, the Supreme Court reactivated the Equal Protection Clause
by its ruling in Brown v. Board of Education219 that segregated
elementary schools violated equal protection. This ruling effectively
overturned Plessy v. Fergusson220 and revived the almost moribund
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown led to a
series of Supreme Court decisions striking down state sponsored
segregation,221 and eventually dismantling the Jim Crow system in the
south. Simultaneously, the civil rights movement of Dr. Martin Luther
King and his followers ignited political opposition to race based
segregation. In response, Congress enacted a new flurry of civil rights
216. Chambers, supra note 96, at 1600.
217. Although it is not a congressional document, the 1947 Report of the President’s
Committee on Civil Rights in an indication of the prevalent view within the federal government
about what rights were linked to citizenship. That document’s discussion of citizenship rights is
limited to the right to vote, and principally, the denial of the right to vote to African Americans by
southern states. See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 32-40 (1947).
218. See Pope, supra note 6, at 5 (“The great social movements that sought to expand
congressional powers during the twentieth century framed their claims in the language of human
rights, not commerce.”).
219. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
220. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
221. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks).
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legislation, beginning with the 1964 Civil Rights Act222 and the 1965
Voting Rights Act.223 Title II of the 1964 Act, like its Reconstruction
Era predecessor almost 100 years before, prohibited race discrimination
in places of public accommodation, and prohibited discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex or religion in employment.224 In 1875, Congress
had viewed the freedom from private discrimination as a right of
citizenship. Congress’ focus had changed by the early 1960s, and as
members of Congress sought a source of power to enact laws preventing
private discrimination, they focused instead on the Equal Protection
Clause and the Commerce Clause. Proponents of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 relied primarily not on the broad promise of freedom and equality
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, but on congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. 225
At the time that Congress was considering the Civil Rights Act of
1964, there was considerable debate about whether Congress should rely
on Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause
powers.226 The Kennedy/Johnson administration argued from the start
that the bill should rest on Commerce Clause powers because that
authority was clearly constitutional.227 But some members of Congress
countered that because the bill was about discrimination and civil rights,
the authority clearly came from the Equal Protection Clause.228 Other
members were concerned about using the Commerce Clause to intrude
on matters that had historically been under local control.229 The reason
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
224. While Title VII originally only applied to private employers, Congress expanded its
coverage in 1972 to state employees.
225. BUREAU OF NATIONAL BUSINESS AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT,
ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: WHAT IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSMEN, UNIONS,
EMPLOYEES, MINORITY GROUPS 81-82, 324 (1964).
226. See A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. (1963);
Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 448 (discussing the congressional debate over the source of its power
to address private discrimination).
227. For example, in his testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee’s hearings in
1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy stated that the law would be “clearly constitutional” under
the commerce clause, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not clearly give Congress the
authority to enact the statute. A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations
Affecting Interstate Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
88th Cong. 28 (1963).
228. Note, for example, the comments of Senator Pastore, “[I] believe in this bill, because I
believe in the dignity of man, not because it impedes out [commerce]. [I] like to feel that what we
are talking about is a moral issue. [A]nd that morality, it seems to me, comes under the Fourteenth
Amendment [about] equal protection of the law.” Id. at 252.
229. For example, Senator Mulroney, a Democratic Senator sympathetic with the policy of the
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why members of Congress relied on the Commerce Clause instead of the
Equal Protection Clause as the primary source of power to enact the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was because Title II of that Act prohibited
discrimination by privately owned places of public accommodation. The
Court’s ruling in the Civil Rights Cases appeared to limit congressional
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause to state action.230
Members of Congress eventually decided to rely on both sources, but do
not appear to have considered the citizenship power as a source for this
legislation.
In support of its use of the commerce power, Congress relied on
reports that individual instances of segregation cost thousands to
millions of dollars because people were deterred by discrimination from
engaging in interstate commerce.231 However, the central focus of the
debate over the bill, which included an 82-day filibuster in the Senate,
“inhered in disputes about the norms and commitments that inhabit the
Equal Protection Clause.”232 Ultimately, the Court upheld Congress’
power to enact the bill under the Commerce Clause and did not reach the
question of whether congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection
Clause could address private discrimination.233 Following rulings by the
law, noted that he was “worried about the use” of the Commerce Clause “on matters which have
been for more than 170 years thought to be within the realm of local control. . . . [If] we pass this
bill, even though the end we seek is good, I wonder how far we are stretching the Constitution.” Id.
at 66.
230. See Estreicher, supra note 108, at 451.
231. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, Hearing on S. 1732 before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., App. V, pp. 1383-87 (1963).
232. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 494.
233. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding the application
of Title II to a hotel in downtown Atlanta to be within Congress’ Commerce Clause powers);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding the application of the bill to a large barbecue
restaurant located eleven blocks from an interstate highway to be within the Commerce Clause
powers). The Court found that the aggregate effect of discrimination on interstate commerce was
sufficient to satisfy its test under Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). On the issue of whether
the commerce power was a proper source of power for anti-discrimination law, the Court stated,
“[t]hat Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its
enactments no less valid. . . . [T]hat fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the
disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse.” Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 257. Congress’ reliance on the commerce clause made it unnecessary for the
Court to re-visit its ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, which appeared to require state action for
congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 49596. Siegel and Post point out the Court’s broad reading of Congress’ power to address private
discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), and that six Justices in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), suggested that Congress
could use its § 5 powers to address private discrimination. See generally, id. They argue, “[b]y the
end of the decade, Congress, the Court and the American people all expected the federal
government to lead the fight against discrimination in the public and private sectors.” Id. at 501.
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Court, Congress accepted the Court’s invitation and based much of its
subsequent civil rights legislation, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act at issue in Garrett,234 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act at issue in Kimel,235 and the civil rights provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1995 at issue in Morrison,236 on its
power under the Commerce Clause and Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.237
B. The Lost Opportunity for Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship
The 1960s were a lost opportunity for a revival of Bingham’s
theory of citizenship. During the 20th Century, members of Congress
did not appear to have considered the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, or the rights of federal citizenship as a source of
power to enact legislation in that era. Yet there is a strong argument that
they could have done so consistently with the intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed above, there is apt authority to
support the view that “the framers intended to grant Congress authority
to protect the fundamental rights of all American citizens, regardless of
the source of the infringement.”238 Moreover, during that time, the
Court was receptive to congressional power, adopting an elastic
approach to legislative action that was conducive to congressional
experimentation while broadening its power to legislate the rights of its
citizens.239 If Congress had based this legislation on its power to enforce
the rights of citizenship, it could have obviated the need for the
expansion of the commerce power and instead modeled a source of

The Guest opinion explicitly reserved the question of whether Congress’ power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause could reach private discrimination, but found that Congress could address private
conduct when enforcing the rights of federal citizenship. See infra notes 284-91 and accompanying
text. In retrospect that may have been an unfortunate result, as the Court sent many signals during
that time that it did not believe that state action was required, and that it might have been willing to
bow to the strong political will behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and overturn the Civil Rights
Cases. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 494.
234. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
235. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
236. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
237. Congress has also often used its spending power to enact anti-discrimination legislation.
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 172 n. 208 (2002). Given the Court’s recent cutbacks on
Congress’ other powers, the spending power is increasingly important as a source of civil rights
legislation. Id.
238. Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 869. See supra Part III.A.
239. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 517 (arguing that the Court saw Congress as a partner
in making its vision of the Fourteenth Amendment “more firmly law” during the 1960s).
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rights that provided broad power to enforce the rights of its citizens
without unduly threatening the sovereignty of the states.
While John Bingham and the other framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not provide an exhaustive list of citizenship rights, it is
clear that they intended to create a national community, the members of
which were to be protected by laws on an equal basis. Who the national
community includes, as well as the meaning of citizenship itself, have
expanded considerably since the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, while the framers did not consider the right
to vote to be a citizenship right,240 it is now axiomatic that the right to
vote is a right of citizenship. Moreover, while the framers did not
consider women to be equal citizens, they are now considered to be such
as a result of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right
to vote and reflects an expansive vision of the civil rights of women.241
The specific rights of citizenship today therefore cannot and should not
be limited to what the framers intended them to be. Nor is it possible to
determine what those specific rights would have been.242 However,
what is possible to discern is that Bingham and the others intended
Congress to have broad power to define the rights of citizenship over
time and to enact legislation to protect those rights.
The argument that Congress could have relied on its power to
enforce the rights of citizenship is the strongest with regard to Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.243 Like that Act, the Civil Rights Act of
1875 prohibited discrimination in places of private accommodation.
That the Reconstruction Era Congress understood the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 to define and protect the values of citizenship is clear from the
title of the act, “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal
rights,”244 and from repeated references to the rights of federal
citizenship made by supporters of the bill throughout the debate over the
Act.245 Because the provisions of the 1875 and 1964 Acts are so similar,
it takes a small step to consider the protections provided by the 1964 Act
as falling within congressional power to enforce the rights of citizenship,
as intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Envisioning other anti-discrimination legislation, such as the Age

240. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
241. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 960 (2002).
242. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
244. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
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Discrimination in Employment Act at issue in Kimel,246 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act at issue in Garrett,247 as legislation to
protect citizenship rights requires more of a stretch. However, this
legislation arguably enables citizens to participate more broadly in the
national community, and therefore may fall under the rubric of
protection of citizenship rights. When a person suffers discrimination on
the basis of a characteristic that is unrelated to his or her qualifications,
the discrimination limits that person’s ability to participate as an active
and productive member of his or her community and limits his or her
ability to belong to that community. The link to belonging is
particularly clear with regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
which requires states and private employers to make their facilities
accessible to the disabled, enabling them to participate regardless of
their disability.
Finally, the civil rights provision at issue in Morrison,248 which
created a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated
violence, also falls within Congress’ power to protect the rights of its
citizens. Like the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871,249 it is a congressional
attempt to protect the rights of its citizens that states had repeatedly
failed to protect,250 by providing access to federal courts for the
vindication of what Congress had defined as a civil right, the right to be
free from gender motivated violence.251 Thus, it is possible that all of
the statutes at issue in the Court’s recent decisions restricting
congressional power to enforce civil rights might have been based on
Congress’ power to define and protect the rights of its citizens.
V. OVERCOMING BARRIERS WITH THE CITIZENSHIP POWER
Given that the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964,252 why
does it matter that Congress did not base that legislation in its Fourteenth
Amendment citizenship power? It matters because, had Congress relied
on its power to enforce the Citizenship Clause, it could have established
246. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
247. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
248. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
249. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
250. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ariz. et al., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, *5-*6
(2000) (Nos. 99-5) available at LEXSEE 1999 U.S. BRIEFS 5. (arguing that numerous studies of
the treatment of women in state courts show that states are failing to protect women from gender
motivated violence).
251. For a more in-depth argument that the civil rights provision of Violence Against Women
Act falls within Congress’ Citizenship Power, see Zietlow, supra note 7, at 328-30.
252. See supra note 233.
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a firm base for other civil rights legislation that it wanted to enact during
periods, like now, when the Court is less deferential to congressional
power.253 Although most people agree that defining and enforcing civil
rights is an important aspect of congressional power,254 the Court’s
recent rulings restricting the commerce power, and the power to enforce
Equal Protection under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, have
greatly weakened Congress’ power to enact civil rights legislation. If
Congress were to return to Bingham’s theory of citizenship,
congressional power to define and enforce the rights of citizenship might
provide a solution to both problems.
A. The Barriers
The recent rulings of the Court have created two barriers to
Congress enacting civil rights legislation, limiting congressional power
to protect its citizens against both private and state discrimination. First,
the Court’s ruling in United States v. Morrison255 greatly limits
Congress’ power to regulate discriminatory private activity.256 In
Morrison, the Court disregarded congressional data that violence against
women caused economic harm and held that gender motivated violence
was simply a matter of family and criminal law and could therefore not
be addressed by Congress’ power to regulate commerce.257 Because the
Court in Morrison also drew a firm line on requiring state action to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause,258 after Lopez259 and Morrison,
Congress’ power to address private discrimination was limited to
prohibiting discriminatory activity that the Court defines as economic.260
253. See Pope, supra note 6, at 116 (arguing that if the New Deal Era Congress had relied on
the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than the commerce power, to enact protective labor legislation,
there would have been no need “to inflate the commerce clause beyond recognition,” and Congress’
human rights powers might have escaped “permanent truncation.”).
254. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 76; Jed Rubenfeld, The
Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). That this is an area of almost
universal agreement is evident from the paucity of scholarship arguing that states, and not the
federal government, are better suited to protect civil rights. See David J. Barron, The Promise of
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Nelson Lund,
Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045 (1997).
255. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
256. Thus, in Morrison the Court reaffirmed the determination to limit the commerce power
that it expressed in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), while at the same time continuing
to apply the nineteenth century limits on Congress’ human rights powers, in the form of the state
action requirement from The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Pope, supra note 6, at 6.
257. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
258. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
259. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
260. Resnik, supra note 8.
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The second barrier to Congress’ power to enact civil rights
legislation is that the Court has greatly reduced Congress’ power under
Section five to enforce the Equal Protection Clause with its
“congruence” and “proportionality” test of City of Boerne v. Flores.261
This test makes it difficult for Congress to enable private parties to sue
states for discriminating against them because in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,262 the Court held that Congress cannot use its commerce power
to abrogate state’s immunity to suits by private parties, leaving Section
five as the only source of congressional power to abrogate sovereign
immunity.263
On its own, Seminole Tribe already creates a significant barrier to
Congress making a state accountable for discrimination. But the true
impact of Seminole Tribe was not apparent until the Court applied
Boerne to the civil rights legislation enacted since the 1960s, which is
based on Congress’ power to enforce Section five as well as the
commerce power. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett264 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,265 the Court held that
Congress’ Section five power did not extend to legislation prohibiting
discrimination based on disability and age, respectively, categories that
the Court itself has not identified as meriting heightened equal protection
scrutiny.266 The Court’s narrow reading of Congress’ Section five power
in Kimel and Garrett have virtually disabled Congress from abrogating
sovereign immunity and making states accountable for their
discriminatory actions.
Ironically, the statutes at issue in Kimel and Garrett, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the American’s with Disabilities
Act, respectively, remain good law because Congress also based them on
its commerce power and both statutes regulate economic activity.
However, those statutes are now unenforceable against state actors by
private parties, and therefore are essentially limited to addressing private
discrimination.267 Thus, the Court has created a strange dichotomy—
261. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
262. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
263. The Court had earlier held that Congress can abrogate states’ sovereign immunity with
legislation based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976).
264. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
265. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
266. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-72; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87.
267. The federal government can still sue states to enforce the ADA and the ADEA. See
generally Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). However, given the limited
resources of the federal government, direct federal enforcement of civil rights statutes is not a viable
alternative for most individuals who remain formally protected by those statutes. See Zietlow,
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Congress can address only private (and not state) discrimination in the
economic realm, and Congress cannot address private discrimination in
non-economic realms.
There are also some more subtle pitfalls of Congress’ reliance on
the commerce power to enact civil rights legislation, illustrated in the
Court’s recent rulings of Morrison, Kimel and Garrett. Congress’
reliance on the connection of the regulated activity to interstate
commerce, instead of the connection of that activity to the principles of
belonging, protection and equality from the rights of citizenship, has
enabled the Court to require all civil rights legislation that addresses
private activity to be economic in nature, reducing its potential to protect
human rights. In Morrison, the Court struck down the civil rights
provision of the Violence Against Women Act268 because it did not
regulate economic activity.269 Congress had identified that provision as
a civil rights remedy,270 but the Court didn’t believe Congress. The
Court saw the remedy as a family law remedy, thus beyond federal
power altogether.271 With regard to state action, on the other hand, civil
rights legislation that only addresses economic activity is not enough.
Once the Court views the regulated activity as economic, it appears to
discount the human rights protecting nature of that legislation, thus
finding it beyond Congress’ Section five power. Thus, in Kimel and
Garrett, the Court appears to view the ADEA and ADA as only
economic based, and not human rights based, legislation. 272

supra note 237, at 207-08.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
269. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (determining “[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”) In so ruling, the Court
disregarded numerous congressional findings linking gender motivated violence to interstate
commerce. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 630-33 (2001) (arguing that the Court both ignored the
extensive congressional record showing the connection between gender-motivated violence and
interstate commerce, and reinforced the stereotype of women as belonging outside the economic
realm.).
270. The provision was entitled a “civil rights remedy” and created a federal cause of action
against any person “who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives
another of the right [to be free from that violence].” 42 U.S.C. §13981. In both language and
purpose, §13981 mirrored the Ku Klux Klan Act of the Reconstruction Era, 42 U.S.C. §1985, which
prohibited conspiracies by “any person” to use violence to interfere with the exercise of the rights of
citizenship. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. See also Resnik, supra note 8, at 642
(arguing Congress had identified violence against women as a national problem, meriting a federal
remedy).
271. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-16. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 619 (critiquing the
Court’s categorical approach in Morrison).
272. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 518.
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B. Overcoming the Barriers?
Thus, the Court has recently created barriers to Congress’ power to
address both private and state discrimination. On the one hand, the
Court has restricted Congress’ use of its commerce power to address
private discrimination because it views that power as unduly threatening
to state sovereignty.273 On the other hand, the Court has restricted
Congress’ use of Section five to address state discrimination because it
sees that power as unduly threatening to its own role as interpreter of the
Constitution.274 The Citizenship Clause could address both concerns, if
interpreted consistently with Bingham’s theory of citizenship.
1. Addressing Private Discrimination
The Court has cut back on the commerce power because it sees that
power as overly threatening to state sovereignty. Without any limiting
principles, the Court feared that the commerce power could become a
general federal police power.275 However, if Congress relied on the
Citizenship Clause and the rights of federal citizenship rather than the
Commerce Clause to enact civil rights legislation such as the ADA and
the ADEA, it could have created a source of rights with a limiting
principle—protecting the rights of federal citizens to belong to a national
community as equal citizens.276 Moreover, if Congress had based the
civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act on its power
to protect federal citizenship rights,277 then it might have been harder for
the Court to re-categorize the law as a family law that encroached on the
traditional province of the states.278 In John Bingham’s vision of
273. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Post & Siegel, supra
note 6.
274. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Post & Siegel, supra note 6.
275. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
276. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1099 (“In our view Congress has the power to
pass laws that protect the equal citizenship of Americans.”).
277. I have argued elsewhere that Congress could have done so, since providing victims of
gender motivated violence access to federal courts fits well within the paradigm of belonging,
protection and equality that identifies citizenship rights. See Zietlow, supra note 7, at 328-29.
278. Of course, it is very possible that the Court would have applied its own categorical
approach and identified § 13981 as a family law provision no matter what source of power Congress
purported to rely on. Jed Rubenfeld has recently argued that the Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed in this article are motivated by an anti-discrimination agenda. See Rubenfeld, supra note
253. If so, it could be futile to search for an alternate source of congressional power to enact civil
rights legislation. However, given the Court’s recent receptive attitude towards federal citizenship
rights in other cases, those rights seem the most promising source of law to alter this Court’s
direction regarding anti-discrimination laws.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

45

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 5
NEWZEITLOW.DOC

762

7/28/03 11:50 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:717

citizenship rights, states still retained the power to bestow rights upon
their citizens, but federal citizenship would provide the standard as a
baseline of rights that could not be taken away.279 This overlapping
theory of jurisdiction is considerably less threatening to states than the
general police power potential of the commerce power.
The Court’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases280 may pose an
obstacle to this approach. In that case, the Court held that the 1875 Civil
Rights Act281 fell beyond Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment because that power was limited to remedying state action.
In dicta, the Court used language that could be interpreted to limit
Congress’ power to enforce citizenship rights.282 Moreover, the Court
did not distinguish between provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in
that ruling. However, in subsequent rulings, the Court has only followed
the Civil Rights Cases when interpreting Congress’ power to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause.283 Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the
Citizenship Clause does not contain the prefatory phrase “no state
shall.”284 Moreover, because of the structural nature of federal
citizenship rights, which are directly linked to the relationship between
the state and federal government, citizenship rights might not be limited
by the state action requirement.
In United States v. Guest,285 the Court ruled that the state action
requirement did not limit Congress’ power to protect the rights of
citizenship.286 In Guest, the Court upheld the indictment of private
individuals for conspiring to prevent a person from using state facilities
because of his race, thereby interfering with his right to engage in
interstate travel.287 The Court treated the right to travel differently than
the other equal protection rights at issue in the case, noting that “[t]he
279. See Fox, supra note 80, at 134, citing Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under
the Fourteenth Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMM. 123,
141 (1986).
280. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
281. 18 Stat. 335 (1975).
282. Id. The Court said that the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt under the
Fourteenth Amendment “is not general legislation upon the rights of citizen. . . .” Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14.
283. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
284. Of course, this argument only works if the Citizenship Clause is enforceable separately
from the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which does contain the prefatory “no state shall”
language, and does appear to be limited to state action.
285. U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
286. Id. The Guest Court reserved the issue of whether Congress could reach private action
when enforcing the equal protection clause. Id.
287. Id. at 760. But see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 679-80 (distinguishing Guest on the grounds
that some state official was involved in the private activity at issue in Guest).
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constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”288 The Court
then emphasized the structural nature of the right to travel, pointing out
“it is important to reiterate that the right to travel freely . . . finds
constitutional protection that is quite independent of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”289 The structural nature of the right to travel is the reason
that the Court also stated, “the constitutional right of interstate travel is a
right secured against interference from any source whatever, whether
governmental or private.”290 Thus, in Guest the Court found that the
federal government is able to enforce rights of federal citizenship against
private parties if those rights are inherent in the structure of the federal
government.291
Similarly, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, a unanimous Court ruled that
42 U.S.C. §1985(3), a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute which
provided a civil remedy for victims of private conspiracies aimed at
depriving them “of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws . . . (or) of having or exercising
any right of privilege of a citizen of the United States,” was not limited
by state action.292 The Court’s ruling in Griffin expressed a particularly
broad reading of congressional power to address private deprivations of
federal rights.293 The Court stated “that there is nothing inherent in the
phrase [equal protection of the laws] that requires the action working the
deprivation to come from the state”294 and opined further that Congress’
failure to insert any “state action” requirement into section 1985(3)
indicated its intent to reach “all deprivations of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ . . . whatever their source.”295 The Court held that §1985(3) fell
288. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757.
289. Id. at 759 n.17.
290. Id.
291. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1047, 1940 (1994).
292. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1971).
293. See Estreicher, supra note 108, at 498: (citing The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 3, 100 (1971)) (arguing that “[i]n effect, Griffin could be read to transform the Bill of
Rights protections into a ‘federal common law against [private] racial conspiracies.’”).
294. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97.
295. The Court limited the breadth of its ruling somewhat by noting that §1985(3) applied only
to conspiracies motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus. . . .” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), the Court again declined to precisely define the meaning of “class” for
the purposes of §1985(3), but stated that “the term unquestionably connotes something more than a
group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the §1985(3) defendant
disfavors.” Bray, 506 U.S. at 275. The Court was concerned that otherwise the statute would be
turned into a “general federal tort law.” Id.
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within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment but also
noted that the right to travel, “like other rights of national citizenship,” is
“assertable against private as well as government interference.”296
Finally, there is an interesting parallel between the Thirteenth
Amendment, which does not require state action, and the Citizenship
Clause.297 Many members of the 39th Congress believed that the
Thirteenth Amendment had the effect of making former slaves
citizens.298 This connection is reflected in the fact that a vast majority of
Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment gave them the
power to enact the 1866 Civil Rights Act, with its Citizenship Clause
and protection for the rights of citizenship.299 The Supreme Court has
held that Congress’ power to address private discrimination in real estate
transactions fell within its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power.300
Similarly, the right to own property was one of the principle rights of
citizenship recognized by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.301
The connection between the Citizenship Clause and the Thirteenth
Amendment provides further support for the argument that Congress’
power to define and protect citizenship rights is not limited to state
action.302
296. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06. The plaintiffs had asserted that they were deprived of “their
rights to travel the public highways without restraint in the same terms as white citizens in Kemper
County, Mississippi.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106.
297. The Thirteenth Amendment states affirmatively, “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amd. XIII
(emphasis added). It was directed primarily at ending the private ownership of slaves.
298. Thanks to Richard Aynes for pointing this parallel out to me.
299. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
300. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of
42 U.S.C. §1982). The Court has also found that 42 U.S.C. §1981, which prohibits race
discrimination in private contracts, falls within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment. In both cases, the Court ruled that the legislation was justified by Congress’ power to
remedy the “badges and incidents” of slavery. Significantly the Petitioners in Jones had argued that
§1982 was justified by Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as well. The Court
sidestepped that determination, which would probably have required it to revisit its ruling in the
Civil Rights Cases, and upheld the statute solely on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement powers. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 496.
301. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
302. Although the Thirteenth Amendment is conventionally considered to only address
“badges and incidents of slavery,” some lawmakers and reformers have considered it to be a source
of a much wider range of laws protecting individual rights. For example, labor leaders in the first
half of the Twentieth Century argued forcefully that the Thirteenth Amendment was a source of
congressional power to enact protective labor legislation. See generally Pope, supra note 6. In
addition, the Justice Department under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt developed a wide
ranging litigation strategy for enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for instituting “free
labor” and prohibiting various kinds of legal and economic coercion. See generally Risa Goluboff,
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The Court’s rulings in Guest and Griffin, that state action is not
required for Congress to protect federal citizenship rights, suggest that
citizenship rights may still provide a font of congressional power to
address private violations of those rights, notwithstanding the Court’s
ruling in the Civil Rights Cases. More recently, in United States v.
Morrison, the Court relied on the Civil Rights Cases when it held that
Congress could not use its Section five power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause to reach actions of private parties.303 In Morrison¸ the
Court appears to have hardened its stance on the state action requirement
and the opinion could be interpreted to limit all Section five based
legislation addressing state action. However, Morrison, like the Civil
Rights Cases, involved legislation based on the Equal Protection Clause.
It might be possible to distinguish the ruling from congressional
enforcement of citizenship rights on that basis.
2. Addressing State Discrimination
The Court has cut back on congressional power to enforce equal
protection rights under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it sees that power as unduly threatening to the institutional role
of the Court. Like equal protection rights, citizenship rights are clearly
enforceable against the states pursuant to Section five. Whether or not
Congress’ use of the citizenship power could overcome the restrictive
barriers imposed by the Court in Kimel304 and Garrett305 will depend on
how the Court would apply the congruence and proportionality test of
Boerne v. Flores306 to congressional enforcement of citizenship rights.
For several reasons, it is possible that the Court might act more
deferentially towards Congress’ use of its citizenship power than it has
towards Congress’ use of its power to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause.
In Boerne the Court held that legislation enforcing Section five
must be congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation being
remedied.307 That is, Court said that Congress can’t create rights that
would not otherwise be found in the Constitution. In Garrett and Kimel,
the Court applied the Boerne test stringently, holding that the ADA and
the ADEA are beyond congressional enforcement power because they
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L. J. 1209 (2001).
303. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
304. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
305. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
306. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
307. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
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give plaintiffs more rights than they would otherwise have if they sued
directly under the Equal Protection Clause. In earlier rulings, the Court
had held that both age and disability based classifications are subject to
rational basis review, requiring only a legitimate government purpose to
justify a distinction based on those categories.308 According to the
Court, when Congress prohibited discrimination based on age and
disability in the ADEA and the ADA, respectively, it effectively
heightened the level of scrutiny given to distinctions based on those
characteristics in a manner that was inconsistent with the Court’s
treatment of those categories.309 This approach violated the congruence
and proportionality test of Boerne and was therefore beyond
congressional power under Section five.
Notwithstanding the Court’s rulings in Kimel and Garrett, the
Court might feel less threatened by congressional interpretation of the
citizenship power than it is with congressional interpretation of the equal
protection power. Since Brown v. Board of Education,310 the Court has
carefully developed an equal protection jurisprudence in numerous
cases, interpreting Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
the interests of “discrete and insular minorities” and developing a system
of differing levels of scrutiny depending on whether those claiming
Section one protection were “discrete and insular minorities,” as defined
by the Court.311 In contrast to equal protection, the Court has not
developed a clear “citizenship” jurisprudence. The Court has never
interpreted the meaning of the Citizenship Clause, and it has only
considered what a right of citizenship might be in a handful of cases.312
Therefore, it is possible that the Court’s application of the “congruence
and proportionality” test to legislation enforcing the rights of citizens

308. See Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
309. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Congress’ attempt to heighten scrutiny is particularly clear with
respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, in which Congress declared that people with
disabilities are “discrete and insular minorities” meriting heightened governmental protection.
310. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
311. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 fn.4 (1938) (distinguishing
cases in which greater judicial scrutiny might be appropriate, including situations where prejudice
against “discrete and insular minorities” may be a factor). See also Clerburne, 473 U.S. 432
(classifications based on disability merit rational basis scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender based classifications merit “intermediate” scrutiny); Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (age
based classifications merit rational basis scrutiny); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (poverty
based classifications merit rational basis scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(race based classifications merit strict scrutiny).
312. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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might be more deferential, allowing that legislation to withstand the
Court’s scrutiny.
Moreover, the current Supreme Court recently indicated a
receptivity to the Fourteenth Amendment’s values of citizenship in its
ruling in two cases, Saenz v. Roe313 and U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.314 In Saenz, the Court struck down a California state welfare
law as violating the right to travel imbedded in the citizenship provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.315 Significantly, the Court in Saenz cited
both the majority and dissenting opinions in The Slaughter-House Cases
to support its ruling.316In Term Limits, the Court found that states cannot
set limits on the terms of federal representatives because those limits
interfere with the relationship between federal citizens and their
representatives.317 The rights of federal citizenship played a key role in
both cases, which stand in remarkable contrast to the Court’s many
recent rulings against federal power because of its intrusion on state
sovereignty.318 This contrast has led this author to argue elsewhere that
the rights of federal citizenship may set the limits on this Court’s
federalism.319 If so, that approach would be consistent with Bingham’s
theory of citizenship. Although neither Saenz nor Term Limits address
the issues of congressional enforcement of the rights of citizenship,
those rulings indicate that this Court is receptive to those rights and they
should encourage congressional proponents of those rights today.
C. A Cautionary Note
No discussion of the rights of citizenship would be complete
without noting the potential of citizenship to be an exclusionary, rather
than an inclusionary, concept.320 This is particularly worrisome in light
of the current federal government’s response to terrorism, in which it has
rounded up numerous non-citizens for interrogation without apparent
reason other than their nationality. Moreover, even before September
11, 2001, in the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,321 Congress made
313. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
314. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
315. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04.
316. Id.
317. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
318. See Zietlow, supra note 7, at 296-300.
319. Id. at 296.
320. Rogers Smith has written as great deal about this danger. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 19.
See also Fox, supra note 49, at 443 (discussing “tiered and exclusionary” aspects of citizenship).
321. Personal responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconsiliation Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1600, et.
seq. (1996).
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numerous distinctions based on citizenship, denying the basic survival
benefits of food stamps and welfare benefits to non-citizens who are
legally residing in this country. Fortunately, Congress has since
abolished those discriminatory measures, but the danger of future
discrimination and exclusion clearly remains.
The author is mindful of the exclusionary effect potentially
resulting from the Court’s reliance on citizenship as a source of rights.
Although aliens are considered to be “persons” protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole,322 a court or a member of Congress
could find that they are excluded from the protection of the Citizenship
Clause.323 The exclusionary aspect of citizenship is evident in the view
of citizenship of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the
social compact theory that predominated at the time required allegiance
to the government in exchange for its protection.324 According to this
theory of republican citizenship, only citizens are truly members of
society and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship.325
John Bingham’s view of citizenship was arguably somewhat
exclusionary. For example, one of the reasons he opposed the admission
of Oregon as a state was because Oregon allowed non-citizens to vote.
Bingham believed that the franchise should be limited to citizens.326
Similarly, Representative Wilson explained an amendment to the 1866
Civil Rights Act,327 replacing the word “inhabitants,” in the original
draft, with the word “citizens of the United States” on the grounds that
“[t]his amendment is intended to confine the operation of this bill to
citizens of the United States, instead of extending it to the inhabitants of
the several states.”328 On the other hand, Bingham opposed the
amendment because of the exclusionary potential of the latter word. He
stated:
If this is to be the language of the bill, by enacting it are we not

322. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886).
323. See Bosniak, supra note 290, at 1087 (pointing out that the United States laws regarding
the protection of the rights of aliens in the United States is “striking in its apparent capriciousness”).
324. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 630-31 (1866) (Representative Hubbard)
(describing the 1866 Civil Rights Bill: “It is intended to cast the shield of protection over four
million American citizens, including old men, young men, and women and children. . . . We owe
them protection in return for their faithful allegiance.”); Smith, supra note 13, at 730-31.
325. Id.
326. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859) (Representative Bingham) (arguing that
the elective franchise for the election of federal officers should be confined to citizens of the United
States. States can not confer rights of citizenship on aliens).
327. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
328. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
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committing the terrible enormity of distinguishing here in the laws in
respect of life, liberty and property, between the citizen and stranger
within your gates? . . . Sir, that is forbidden by the Constitution of your
country. The great men who made that instrument, when they
undertook to make provision, by limitations upon the power of this
government for the security by the universal rights of man, abolished
the narrow and limited phrase of the old Magna Carta, which gave the
protection of the laws only to “free men” and inserted in the words “no
person,” thereby obeying that higher law given by a voice out of
heaven: “Ye shall have the same law for the stranger as for one of your
own country.”329

Bingham’s impassioned speech shows that his vision was not
entirely exclusionary. The belief of Bingham and many other Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment that people had certain fundamental rights
that warranted protection by the government reflects the other side of the
American tradition of citizenship—the inclusionary nature of our nation
of immigrants. As professor Kenneth Karst has commented, “[e]quality
and belonging are inseparably linked; to define the scope of the ideal of
equality in America is to define the boundaries of the national
community.”330 Even, the Supreme Court has been willing to blur the
lines between citizens and non-citizens even in finding individual rights
where citizenship was an important factor. For example, the Court
emphasized the connection between education and citizenship in the
case of Plyler v. Doe,331 even as it ruled in favor of the non-citizen
plaintiffs and found that they had a right to state funding of their public
education. The Court’s ruling in Plyler indicates that citizenship-based
rights need not be exclusionary in scope. The author is hopeful that
members of Congress would follow the Court’s lead in Plyler when
legislating the rights of citizenship.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Citizenship Clause and the rights of federal
citizenship remain a fertile source of congressional power to enact civil
rights legislation even after Morrison, Kimel and Garrett. It’s time to
revitalize Bingham’s vision of citizenship so that Congress can still
define and protect our rights in the Twenty-first Century.

329. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1858).
330. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 2 (1989). See also Forbath, supra note
215 (discussing progressive vision of citizenship rights).
331. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
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